Does distrust in politically affiliated media induce a bias in investor beliefs? We study the acquisition of Dow Jones & Co. by News Corporation in 2007 as a shock to the political affiliation of Dow Jones outlets. Following the acquisition, the prices of Republican- (Democrat-) aligned stocks become less sensitive to favorable (unfavorable) Dow Jones Newswires (DJNW) sentiment, consistent with the market attaching less credibility to a politically affiliated source. There is, however, no evidence of change in DJNW sentiment, coverage, or language about Republican/Democrat stocks, suggesting a loss of stock price informativeness. Consistent with this view, a portfolio exploiting the attenuated reaction to DJNW news earns abnormal returns following 2007.

We use a two-year panel of individual accounts in an S&P 500 index mutual fund to examine the trading and investment behavior of more than 91 thousand investors who have chosen a low-cost, passively managed vehicle for savings.This allows us to characterize investors' heterogeneity in terms of their investment patterns.In particular, we identify positive feedback traders as well as contrarians whose activities are conditional upon preceding day stock market moves.We test the consistency and profitability of these conditional strategies over time.We find that more frequent traders are typically contrarians, while infrequent traders are more typically momentum investors.The dynamics of these investor classes help us to partially examine the question of the marginal investor over the period of our study.We find that the behavior of momentum investors is typically more correlated to changes in the S&P 500 and we trace its dynamics over time.We build up "behavioral factors" based on contrarian and momentum flows and show that they perform well against a benchmark of loadings on latent factors extracted from returns.We also use the behavior of momentum and contrarian investors to build a measure of "market polarization".This captures the dispersion of beliefs among the investors and helps to account for asset pricing better than standard measures of dispersion of beliefs.

We study the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on the bond market. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. corporate bonds, we document that the presence of CDSs significantly increases bond liquidity and reduces yield spreads for investment grade bonds. We show that CDSs influence the bond market by lowering the impact of fire sales of institutional bondholders and facilitating inventory management for bond dealers who absorb fire sale shocks. However, the liquidity provision role of CDSs gets weakened after the CDS Big Bang in 2009, potentially because of the requirement of large upfront payments.

We use an exogenous event, namely, the spillover effects of Hurricane Katrina on corporate bonds through the liquidation of bond holdings by insurance companies, to study how companies react to temporary changes in the relative availability of bond and bank financing. We find that the negative shock on bonds induces firms to shift from bond financing to bank-based borrowing and to shorten the debt maturity. This shift in debt policy does not revert in the long term. There is no significant change in capital structure, suggesting that the substitution from bonds to bank loans is sufficient for the amount of borrowing.

We study the link between information barriers in global markets and the organizational form of asset management. Fund families outsource funds in which they are at an informational disadvantage to generate performance. Using a structural model of self-selection, we endogenize the outsourcing decision and estimate positive gains from outsourcing of 4–14 basis points per month, thereby reconciling underperformance of outsourced funds with performance maximization by fund families. The gains from outsourcing provide a novel proxy for the information barriers that segment global financial markets: The more segmented the underlying markets where the funds invest, the larger the gains from outsourcing.

We show that mutual funds employ portfolio strategies based on market sentiment. We build a proxy for the degree of a fund’s sentiment beta (or FSB). The low-FSB funds outperform high-FSB funds, even after controlling for standard risk factors and fund characteristics. This effect is sizable and delivers a net-of-risk performance of 3.8% per year. Funds with a lower FSB follow more idiosyncratic strategies, suggesting that FSB is a deliberate, active choice of the fund manager. A sentiment contrarian strategy leads to high flows due to its superior performance, whereas a sentiment catering strategy fails to attract significant investor flows.

We study what determines catering through the payout policy and how catering affects firm value. We create a catering index, measuring how the firm caters to its investors’ payout preferences. The index is based on the revealed payout preferences of mutual funds holding the firm’s stocks. Catering is constrained by market segmentation and dispersion in investor payout preferences. It is also associated with positive value effects: Firms increasing their catering index also experience an increase in value. Furthermore, greater catering ability is associated with a more positive market reaction to corporate announcements of equity issues and dividend payouts.

We study the role played by the informal links, or “connections,” between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. Using data on a large sample of multisegment U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2004, we show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow shortfalls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments’ cash flow). At the firm level, having more connected managers presiding over segments with high Tobin’s Q improves resource allocation and increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mutual trust associated with connections reduces the need for wasteful reallocation of resources across divisions of conglomerate firms.

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.