Knowledge that Transforms

Miller (1977) hypothesizes that dispersion of investor opinion in the presence of short-sale constraints leads to stock price overvaluation. However, previous empirical tests of Miller's hypothesis examine the valuation effects of only one of these two necessary conditions. We examine the valuation effects of the interaction between differences of opinion and shortsale constraints. We find robust evidence of significant overvaluation for stocks that are subject to both conditions simultaneously. Stocks are not systematically overvalued when either one of these two conditions is not met.

We examine the cross section of stock returns using an original dataset consisting of annual observations on price, dividends, and shares outstanding for nearly all stocks listed on U.K. exchanges between 1870 and 1913, supplemented with additional information about attrition. The only clear pattern in the historical U.K. data is the high returns of extremely small stocks. Among the largest 99.8% of stocks, the historical U.K. data do not display the pattern found in modern U.S. (CRSP) data of excess returns for small stocks or stocks with poor past performance. Unlike CRSP data, stocks that do not pay dividends do not outperform stocks that pay small dividends during this period. However, as in the modern data, there is a weak relation between dividend yield and performance for stocks that pay dividends.

Extant theoretical research posits that information asymmetry and agency issues affect the cost of external financing and hence impact the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities. In contrast, the literature on disclosure policy posits that expanded and credible disclosure lowers the cost of external financing and improves a firm's ability to pursue potentially profitable projects. An empirical implication is that disclosure can help firms grow by relaxing external financing constraints, thereby allowing capital to flow to positive net present value projects. This paper empirically evaluates this prediction using firm-level data over an 11-year period. As anticipated by theory, we find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and the externally financed growth rate, after controlling for other influences.

We propose an explanation for the “disappearing dividend” phenomenon: a decline in the information content of dividend announcements, which reduces the propensity of firms to use dividends as a costly signal. A reason for a decline in the information content of dividends is the rise in holdings by institutional investors that are more sophisticated and informed. Indeed, we find a decline in CAR at dividend change announcements since the mid–1970s. Across firms, CAR is a decreasing function of institutional holdings. Institutional investors exploit their superior information and buy before dividend increases. In addition, dividends are less likely to rise in firms with high institutional holdings.

We find that firms that regularly access public debt (bond) markets are more likely to pay a dividend and subsequently follow a dividend smoothing policy than firms that rely exclusively on private (bank) debt. In particular, firms with bond ratings follow a traditional Lintner (1956) style dividend smoothing policy, where the influence of the prior dividend payment is very strong and the current dividend is relatively insensitive to current earnings. In contrast, firms without bond ratings flow through more of their earnings as dividends and display very little dividend smoothing behavior. In effect, they seem to follow a residual dividend policy.

We test whether a bias exists in analyst recommendations for firms that file for bankruptcy during 1995–2001. We fail to find overoptimism in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts. Our multivariate analysis of the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations indicates that prior affiliation exerts no impact on either returns or trading volume. We find that the market does not view recommendation upgrades by affiliated analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following these recommendation changes. Overall, our results suggest that recently passed legislation to reduce analysts' conflicts of interest might be an overreaction.

This paper examines the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the economic impact of corporate capital investments. I find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for focused firms than for diversified firms. I also show that focused firms exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance than diversified firms. The overall findings in this study suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of the net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firms.

This paper investigates whether some individuals are prone to behavioral biases in their 401(k) investments. Using demographic data and allocation information for over 73,000 employees, I examine two allocation biases and a participation bias. The findings suggest that higher salaried employees tend to make significantly better choices. Participants who earn $100, 000 hold 12. 7% less in company stock, are 3% less likely to follow the framing 1/ n heuristic, and are 37.7% more likely to participate than those earning $46, 000. Women make better choices in two of the three cases and I find evidence of mental accounting.

We examine how analysts establish target prices for IPO firms and whether comparable firms used to support target prices are helpful in explaining IPO offer prices. During the bubble period of 1999 to 2000, the average offer price was set at a discount relative to comparable firm valuations. In contrast, the average offer price was set at a small premium relative to comparables in the pre-bubble period. This shift appears to hold even after controlling for the differences in the types of firms going public during the bubble period. Moreover, target prices of IPO firms were set at a higher premium relative to comparables during the bubble period. While our results suggest that underwriters systematically discounted offer prices during the bubble period, an alternative explanation is that the shift arose because underwriters and analysts faced different incentives and legal exposures during the bubble period.

This paper conducts empirical tests in a conditional setting for 10 developed and 12 emerging markets to determine whether emerging market currency risk is priced and if it spills over into developed market assets. Our empirical model is based on real exchange rate measures and it allows currency risk to compete with broader economic and political risks. We find that emerging market currency risk is priced separately from other local risk factors and that it represents a significant component of equity returns in both developed and emerging markets. We also find that the spillover impact is heightened during emerging market crisis episodes and affects the expected compensation for global risks.