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ANALYSIS and listened to the lamentations of countless numbers of colleagues concerning the rate at which the literature is expanding, the field of finance seems to cry out for a precious period of time, however brief it may be, to catch its breath. There appears to be little doubt that keeping up with new ideas, infused into the milieu which is finance, and reincarnated old ideas, clothed in a garb more fitting to the contemporary scene, is at best a most difficult task, especially with the increasing degree of specialization of previously neat and identifiable compartments.

Firms whose human capital is concentrated in a few irreplaceable employees lack diversification in their human capital stock, exposing them to key human capital risk. Using disclosures of “key man life insurance” to measure this risk, we show that exposed firms are riskier. These younger, smaller, growth firms have abnormally high volatility, and following announcement of key employee departures, the most exposed firms lose 8% of their value. Key employees tend to be highly educated. They are four times more likely to hold PhD degrees than top managers, and firms with key human capital are more innovative.

The substantial growth of the mutual fund industry during the last few years has attracted the attention of students of finance, economics, and public policy alike. Net assets managed by such funds have grown from approximately $450 million in 1940 to more than $38 billion by June of 1966. During 1965 the mutual fund industry funneled some $5. billion of new (primarily equity) funds into the capital markets; more than twice the $2. billion in new equity raised by all non-financial United States corporations during the year. Growth of the industry has not been uniform, however, but has been concentrated among a relatively small number of highly successful funds.

We quantify the scarcity value of Treasury collateral by estimating the impact of security-specific demand and supply factors on the specific collateral repurchase agreement (repo) rates of all outstanding U.S. Treasury securities. We find a positive and significant scarcity premium for on- and off-the-run Treasuries that persists for approximately 3 months and is larger in magnitude for shorter-term securities. This scarcity effect seems to pass through to Treasury cash market prices, providing additional evidence for the scarcity channel of quantitative easing (QE). On the contrary, the Federal Reserve’s reverse repo operations could help reduce the scarcity premium by alleviating potential shortages of high-quality collateral.

Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are frequently thought of as risk-free real bonds. Using no-arbitrage term structure models, we show that TIPS yields exceeded risk-free real yields by as much as 100 basis points when TIPS were first issued and up to 300 basis points during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This spread predominantly reflects the poorer liquidity of TIPS relative to nominal Treasury securities. Other factors, including the indexation lag and the embedded deflation protection in TIPS, play a much smaller role. Ignoring this spread also significantly distorts the informational content of TIPS break-even inflation, a widely used proxy for expected inflation.

This paper investigates the relation between information on the state of the economy and equity risk premium. We use a setup where investors have Epstein-Zin preferences and the economy randomly switches between booms and recessions. We are able to establish 2 key results: First, investors with high elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) will require lower excess returns for holding stocks if they are provided with better information on the state of the economy. Second, we find that this also holds for investors with moderate EIS if they are sufficiently risk averse.

This study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

We examine the association between margin requirements and the market’s efficiency in incorporating firm-specific and market-level public news. Combining the Fed’s 22 changes in margin requirements with a hand-collected sample of earnings announcements between 1934 and 1975, we show that higher margin requirements induce greater delay in incorporating earnings information into prices. We draw similar conclusions when we analyze the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) price delay measure, as well as indirect measures of leverage constraints over recent years. Further tests suggest that, despite the Fed’s expressed intent to curtail excess speculation, higher margin requirements restrict trading by arbitrageurs more than noise traders.