Knowledge that Transforms

This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.

This article studies time variation in the expected excess returns of traded claims on dividends, bonds, and stock indices for international markets. We introduce a novel dividend risk factor that complements the bond risk factor of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). By aggregating over 4 regions (United States, United Kingdom, Eurozone, and Japan), we create global dividend and bond factors. Our global 2-factor model captures the excess returns of most Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) country indices, as well as a variety of other test assets. Our findings highlight the value of the information contained in dividend and bond forward curves and suggest substantial comovement in international risk premia.

In this paper we present empirical tests of an extended version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that replaces the single-period horizon with a probability distribution over different horizons. Adopting a simple parameterization of the probability distribution of the length of the horizon, we estimate the parameters of the distribution as well as the parameters of the CAPM. We find that the extended model is not rejected for several different samples of common stocks, and for these samples it outperforms not only the standard CAPM but also the Fama–French (1993) 3-factor model. The probability distribution over horizon dates varies over time with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) turnover rate. We also find that returns satisfy the Euler equation of a representative financial institution that holds the market portfolio and has horizon probabilities estimated from 13F filings.

Using a fast numerical technique, we investigate a large database of investors’ suboptimal nonexercise of short-maturity American call options on dividend-paying stocks listed on the Dow Jones. The correct modeling of the discrete dividend is essential for a correct calculation of the early exercise boundary, as confirmed by theoretical insights. Pricing with stochastic volatility and jumps instead of the Black–Scholes–Merton benchmark cuts the amount lost by investors through suboptimal exercise by one-quarter. The remaining three-quarters are largely unexplained by transaction fees and may be interpreted as an opportunity cost for the investors to monitor optimal exercise.

We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.

We analyze the relation between expected option returns and the volatility of the underlying securities. The expected return from holding a call (put) option is a decreasing (increasing) function of the volatility of the underlying. These predictions are supported by the data. In the cross section of equity option returns, returns on call (put) option portfolios decrease (increase) with underlying stock volatility. This finding is not due to cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns. It holds in various option samples with different maturities and moneyness, and is robust to alternative measures of underlying volatility and different weighting methods.

We propose a new approach, based on investment data, to determine firms’ return exposure to investment-specific technology (IST) shocks. When applied to U.S. data, we find that, in contrast to the pattern estimated from empirical IST proxies, value firms have higher exposure to IST shocks than growth firms. When applied to simulated data from existing theoretical models, our approach reveals that existing empirical findings may result from measurement errors in the IST proxies. Importantly, our simulation analysis uncovers the key role played by investment data in determining the economic mechanism through which IST shocks affect cross-sectional asset prices.

We examine impediments to liquidity provision by mutual funds to insurance companies during corporate bond fire sales. We find that financial regulation and limited capital capacity significantly affect liquidity provision. Mutual funds reduced their purchase of fire-sale bonds following regulatory changes after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Funds facing more capital constraints (proxied by smaller cash and Treasury holdings, less liquid corporate bond investments, higher redemption risk, and less active investment styles) provide less liquidity. Mutual funds actively investing in fire-sale bonds earn significant returns from liquidity provision and demonstrate superior overall skills in corporate bond investments.

We examine the effects of a temporary suspension of short-sale price tests on the options market. Consistent with the notion that put option trading substitutes for short selling, we find a significant reduction in put option volume. In addition, pressure on put option prices significantly declines, violations of the put-call parity become significantly less frequent, and option volume becomes less informed. Our findings add clarity to a long-standing debate on whether investors use options to circumvent equity short-selling restrictions.