Philip J. Lee, Stephen L. Taylor, Terry S. Walter, IPO Underpricing Explanations: Implications from Investor Application and Allocation Schedules, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 425-444

Using synchronous transactions data for IBM from the New York, Pacific, and Midwest Stock Exchanges, we estimate an error correction model to investigate whether each of the exchanges is contributing to price discovery. Johansen's test yields two cointegrating vectors, which together verify the expected long-run equilibrium of equal prices across the three exchanges. Two error correction terms specified as the differences from IBM prices on the NYSE indicate that adjustments maintaining the long-run cointegration equilibrium take place on all three exchanges. That is, IBM prices on the NYSE adjust toward IBM prices on the Midwest and Pacific Exchanges, just as Midwest and Pacific prices adjust to the NYSE.

Abstract We study the informativeness of trades via discount and full-service retail brokers. We find that trades via full-service retail brokers are statistically and economically more informative than are trades via discount retail brokers. This finding holds in every year over the 12-year sample period and in various subsamples. We also find that past returns, volatility, and news announcements positively relate to the net volume of discount retail brokers, but these variables are unrelated to the net volume of full-service retail brokers. Our results suggest that broker type selection bias is an important consideration in studying individual investors’ trades.

Abstract We exploit the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a new measure of funding liquidity risk that varies within funds. We find that hedge funds with lower funding risk generate higher returns, and this effect is driven by their increased exposure to equity-mispricing anomalies. Our results are robust to a variety of sampling criteria, variable definitions, and control variables. Further, we address endogeneity concerns in various ways, including a placebo approach and regression discontinuity design. Collectively, our results support a causal link between funding risk and the ability of managers to engage in risky arbitrage.

Abstract We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

We study earnings management (EM) efforts surrounding seasoned bond offerings using discretionary current accruals. We find that issuers tend to inflate earnings performance prior to an offering. In order for EM efforts to effectively mislead ratings agencies and the bond market, they must lead to inflated bond ratings and decreased offering yields. Regression results indicate the opposite; aggressive EM efforts are associated with lower initial ratings and higher offering yields. We also find a statistically lower proportion of subsequent downgrades for firms with the most aggressive EM efforts, which is inconsistent with these firms’ inflated initial ratings. While some firms may attempt to mislead ratings agencies and market participants by window-dressing earnings, these efforts appear to be counterproductive.

Abstract In a sample of non-U.S. regulatory regime shifts, we find that expanded short selling is associated with stock price declines, reductions in capital expenditure, and lower asset growth. In a reversal of results found for U.S. stocks in a study of Regulation SHO by Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015), our results are stronger for large firms than for small firms. We also show that this investment effect is stronger for firms that previously relied on outside financing. Our results suggest that short-sale policies affect corporate investment and that this effect is not driven by capital constraints.

Abstract We examine the effects of a severe climate event on local firms. Our data include 8,218 business credit reports and a detailed survey of 273 businesses in the area affected by Hurricane Harvey. Delinquent credit balances doubled in areas with the worst flooding, although nonflooded areas also had significant credit impairments. Only independent businesses showed signs of distress; subsidiaries of larger firms did not. Firms were largely uninsured and often were denied credit postdisaster. Many funded recovery informally, such as through friends and family. Our findings suggest that several financial frictions compound the challenges posed by a severe climate event.

Abstract Using establishment-level data, we show that COVID-19 vaccinations boost business activity and firm performance in the United States. A 10-percent increase in vaccination rates results in a 4-percent to 6-percent increase in customer visits. We document the channels through which vaccinations increase store visits and the limits to the effect of vaccines on business activity. At the firm level, vaccinations increase sales and earnings, impact expansion decisions, and decrease probability of default, but the benefits vary across businesses. Vaccinations create private economic benefits to firms, shareholders, and employees, in addition to their intended public health benefits.

Abstract We investigate whether firm-level political connections affect the allocation of exemptions from tariffs imposed on $US 550 billion of Chinese goods imported to the United States annually beginning in 2018. Evidence points to politicians not only rewarding supporters but also punishing opponents: Past campaign contributions to the party controlling (in opposition to) the executive branch increase (decrease) approval likelihood. Our findings point to quid pro quo arrangements between politicians and firms, as opposed to the “information” channel linking political access to regulatory outcomes.