We document that firms prefer counties with higher ethnic diversity in locating their interstate investments, especially for those pursuing innovation, seeking to establish service centers, or managing a diverse workforce. We also find some evidence that interstate investment in high ethnic diversity locations results in increased patent applications, sales growth, positive media coverage, and overall operating performance. Taken together, we show that firms prefer to invest in ethnically diverse locations as they recognize the potential benefits of leveraging a diverse labor supply, such as enhancing problem-solving, innovation, and performance. We must recognize that difference is a reason for celebration and growth, rather than a reason for destruction. (Audre Lorde)

We document and explain the sharp performance deterioration of smart beta indexes after the corresponding exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are launched for investment. While smart beta is purported to deliver excess returns through factor exposures, the market-adjusted return of smart beta indexes drops from about 3% “on paper” before ETF listings to about −0.50% to −1% after ETF listings. This performance decline cannot be explained by variation in factor premia, strategic timing, or diminishing returns to scale. Instead, we find strong evidence of data mining in the construction of smart beta indexes, which helps ETFs attract flows, as investors respond positively to backtests.

This article documents novel large-sample evidence on the informational role of interfirm ownership networks in bank lending. Using comprehensive loan-level data in China, we find that banks’ internal loan ratings at issuance predict subsequent delinquent events more accurately when borrowers are connected to banks’ existing customers via ownership networks. In post-issuance monitoring for delinquent loans, banks with access to ownership networks manage to downgrade their initial ratings before late payments. These findings suggest that ownership networks facilitate the transmission of private information for bank lending. Moreover, ownership networks are more important for transmitting information related to small and medium enterprises.

We show that the currency risk embedded in the benchmarks of international mutual funds negatively affects fund performance. More specifically, a high benchmark-implied currency risk induces funds to invest in markets with less volatile currencies, leading to a higher degree of currency concentration in portfolio holdings. This currency concentration, however, departs from the optimal equity allocation strategy across countries and reduces fund performance. We document that funds resorting to high currency concentrations underperform funds with low currency concentrations by as much as 1%–2% per year.

Using unique real estate data that allow for accurately measured capital gains, we examine whether sell propensities depend on the magnitude of a seller’s capital gain. We find that short-term sell propensities are flat over losses and increasing in gains. Consistent with their higher sell propensities, selling prices are lower for properties with larger gains. Large-sized short-term stock investments also have sell propensities that are flat over losses and increasing in gains, although the sell propensities of typical-sized short-term stock investments are V-shaped. Our findings provide empirical support for theories of realization utility.

We test how market overvaluation affects corporate innovation. Estimated stock overvaluation is strongly associated with measures of innovative inventiveness (novelty, originality, and scope), as well as research and development (R&D) and innovative output (patent and citation counts). Misvaluation affects R&D more via a nonequity channel than via equity issuance. The sensitivity of innovative inventiveness to misvaluation increases with share turnover and overvaluation. The frequency of exceptionally high innovative inputs/outputs increases with overvaluation. This evidence suggests that market overvaluation may generate social value by increasing innovative output and encouraging firms to engage in “moon shots.”

We hypothesize that social trust, in mitigating contracting incompleteness, may have an important effect on the activeness and effectiveness of delegated portfolio management. Using a complete sample of worldwide open-end mutual funds, we find that trust is positively associated with the activeness of funds and that trust-related active share delivers superior performance (e.g., approximately 2% per year for cross-border investments). Moreover, “trust in the market” and “trust in managers” play important yet different roles for different types of cross-border delegated portfolio management. Our results suggest that trust acts as a fundamental building block for delegated portfolio management.

We examine two competing views regarding the impact of competition among credit rating agencies on rating quality: the view that rating agencies do not sacrifice their reputation by inflating firm ratings, and the view that competition among rating agencies arising from the conflict of interest inherent in an “issuer pay” model creates pressure to inflate ratings. Using Fitch’s market share as a measure of competition among rating agencies and controlling for the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable industry effects, we find no relation between Fitch’s market share and ratings, suggesting that competition does not lead to rating inflation.

In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.

We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board governance in the pre-reform period and those in countries with strong external governance mechanisms. Our findings corroborate the dividend outcome model, which postulates that board reforms strengthen the monitoring role of the board and empower outside shareholders to force management to disgorge dividends.