Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper I investigate the role of activist hedge funds in the restructuring of a sample of 469 firms that attempted to resolve distress either out of court, in conventional Chapter 11, or via prepackaged restructuring. Activist hedge funds strategically gain a position of influence in the restructuring of economically viable firms with contracting problems that prevent efficient restructuring without outside intervention. I find that hedge fund involvement is associated with a higher probability of completing prepackaged restructurings, faster restructurings, and greater debt reduction. Overall, the evidence in this article suggests that activist hedge funds can create value by enabling more efficient contracting.

We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.

We show that mutual funds employ portfolio strategies based on market sentiment. We build a proxy for the degree of a fund’s sentiment beta (or FSB). The low-FSB funds outperform high-FSB funds, even after controlling for standard risk factors and fund characteristics. This effect is sizable and delivers a net-of-risk performance of 3.8% per year. Funds with a lower FSB follow more idiosyncratic strategies, suggesting that FSB is a deliberate, active choice of the fund manager. A sentiment contrarian strategy leads to high flows due to its superior performance, whereas a sentiment catering strategy fails to attract significant investor flows.

The consensus view of the influential economist John Maynard Keynes is that he was a stellar investor. We provide an extensive quantitative appraisal of his performance over a quarter century and present detailed analysis of his archived trading records. His top-down approach initially generated disappointing returns with no evidence of any market-timing ability. However, from the early 1930s his performance improved as he evolved into a bottom-up stock picker with substantial active risk and pronounced size and value tilts. Our reconstruction of Keynes’s stock trading provides a unique record of realized performance and sheds light on how equity investing developed historically.

We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.

This paper advances the proposition that share restrictions engender potential conflicts of interest between fund managers and investors. Fund flows predict future fund returns for share-restricted funds, especially among funds with low levels of governance and funds managing insiders’ wealth, providing managers incentive to trade in advance of their clients. Some direct evidence for such managerial action is presented, using proprietary data on managerial investment in their own funds. The evidence suggests that private information about a fund, not necessarily its holdings, may constitute material information, with implications for proper fund governance and disclosure policy concerning managerial actions.

The enterprise multiple (EM) predicts the cross section of international returns. The return predictability of EM is similarly pronounced in developed and emerging markets and likewise strong among small and large firms. An international portfolio of low-EM firms outperforms a portfolio of high-EM firms by about 1% per month. The EM value premium is individually significant for the majority of countries, remains largely unexplained by existing asset pricing models, is robust after controlling for comovement with the respective U.S. premium, and is highly persistent for up to 5 years after portfolio formation, making it a promising strategy for investors.

Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

We construct a mortality table for U.S. public companies during 1985–2006. We find that the age-specific mortality rates of firms initially increase, peaking at age three, and then decrease with age, implying that the first 3 years of public life are critical. Financial intermediaries involved around the “public birth” of a firm (e.g., venture capitalists (VCs) and high-quality underwriters) are associated with lower firm mortality rates, sometimes for up to 7 years after the initial public offering (IPO). VCs reduce mortality rates more through natal financial care than through selection, whereas high-quality underwriters affect firm mortality more through selection.

We examine two competing views regarding the impact of competition among credit rating agencies on rating quality: the view that rating agencies do not sacrifice their reputation by inflating firm ratings, and the view that competition among rating agencies arising from the conflict of interest inherent in an “issuer pay” model creates pressure to inflate ratings. Using Fitch’s market share as a measure of competition among rating agencies and controlling for the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable industry effects, we find no relation between Fitch’s market share and ratings, suggesting that competition does not lead to rating inflation.