Knowledge that Transforms

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This study examines the consequences of conflicts between creditors. Using the setting of debt covenant violations, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of banks’ interventions on their borrowers’ trade credit. The results show that trade credit experiences a substantial decline when banks intervene in the borrowing firm following covenant violations. The decline is mitigated by the presence of dependent suppliers and exacerbated by banks’ incentives to exercise control rights. Such externalities are reflected in the loan-contract design. Borrowing firms sign less restrictive loan contracts when they rely more on trade credit or trade creditors.

We propose a single-factor asset pricing model based on an indicator function of consumption growth being less than its endogenous certainty equivalent. This certainty equivalent is derived from generalized disappointment-aversion preferences, and it is located approximately 1 standard deviation below the conditional mean of consumption growth. Our single-factor model can explain the cross section of expected returns for size, value, reversal, profitability, and investment portfolios at least as well as the Fama–French multifactor models. Our results show strong empirical support for asymmetric preferences and question the effectiveness of the smooth utility framework, which is traditionally used in consumption-based asset pricing.

Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers to the acquisition deals they advise on, we find that individual investment bankers with greater deal experience are associated with higher acquisition returns and post-acquisition operating performance, particularly for acquirers in complex and more opaque industries. The advisory fee on acquisitions is also positively associated with the investment banking team’s experience. Finally, when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that the human capital of individual investment bankers is valuable to acquirers.

We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.

Traditional seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) elicit short selling from traders trying to increase offering discounts. Such short selling is more difficult for shelf offerings because the time between their announcement and issuance tends to be shorter. We predict and find that firms with higher short-selling potential (SSP) are more likely to choose shelf over traditional SEOs. This result is robust to alternative proxies for SSP and other sensitivity tests. Further analysis suggests that shelf issuers aim to mitigate the threat of manipulative short selling. Our findings add to a growing literature showing that short selling has a real impact on corporate finance decisions.

We examine stock index futures and Treasury futures around the release time of 30 U.S. macroeconomic announcements. Nine of the 20 announcements that move markets show evidence of substantial informed trading before the official release time. Prices begin to move in the “correct” direction approximately 30 minutes before the release time. The preannouncement price drift accounts on average for approximately 40% of the total price adjustment. This implies that some traders have private information about macroeconomic fundamentals. Preannouncement drift might originate from a combination of information leakage and superior forecasting that incorporates proprietary data.

We propose a new approach based on a generalization of the logit model to improve prediction accuracy in U.S. bank failures. Mixed-data sampling (MIDAS) is introduced in the context of a logistic regression. We also mitigate the class-imbalance problem in data and adjust the classification accuracy evaluation. In applying the suggested model to the period from 2004 to 2016, we show that it correctly classifies significantly more bank failure cases than the classic logit model, in particular for long-term forecasting horizons. Some of the largest recent bank failures in the United States that had been previously misclassified are now correctly predicted.

I investigate whether bank exposures to sovereign debt during the European debt crisis affected the real economy. I show that a shock to the marked-to-market (MTM) value of bank exposures to sovereign debt led to credit tightening in 2010–2011 that had negative real effects on small and young firms. Because banks do not usually mark their holdings of sovereign bonds to market, I explore the transmission channels of the unrealized losses on credit supply. I show that a shock to MTM exposures reduced short-term bank funding from U.S. money market funds rather than affecting equity or working through alternative channels.