We analyze the bank supply of credit under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The literature emphasizes relationships as a means to improve lender information, which helps banks manage credit risk. Despite imposing no risk, however, the PPP supply reflects traditional measures of relationship lending: decreasing in bank size and increasing in prior experience, commitment lending, and core deposits. Our results suggest a new benefit of bank relationships: They help firms access government-subsidized lending. Consistent with this benefit, we show that the bank PPP supply, based on the structure of the local banking sector, alleviates increases in unemployment.

We examine the extent to which investment opportunities and/or mispricing motivate equity issuance and contribute to post-issue stock underperformance. We decompose market-to-book ratios into misvaluation and growth option components and find that issuing firms are both overvalued and have greater growth opportunities relative to nonissuers. Firms with greater growth opportunities invest more in capital expenditures and research and development (R&D) after issuance but do not experience lower post-issue stock returns. In contrast, issuing firms with greater mispricing tend to decrease long-term debt and/or increase cash holdings and do earn lower returns. Our findings are consistent with behavioral explanations for post-issue stock price underperformance.

We investigate the (sell-side) analyst rankings of Institutional Investor (I/I) and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), using data from 1993–2005. We find that factors with a primary component of recognition are the most important determinants of the rankings, although performance measures are statistically significant determinants in some cases. The single exception to this finding is with existing WSJ stars, where industry-adjusted investment-recommendation performance is the only significant determinant of repeating as a star. Further, in the year after becoming stars, the recommendations of WSJ stars are significantly worse than those of nonstars; and the recommendations and earnings forecasts of I/I stars, as well as the earnings forecasts of WSJ stars, are not significantly different from those of nonstars. We conclude that these rankings are largely “popularity contests.”

Using model-free skewness measures that exploit the asymmetry in semivariances and option data from the over-the-counter currency market, we find that buying currencies with a high skewness risk premium (SRP) and selling currencies with a low SRP generates high returns and a Sharpe ratio. Asset pricing tests—which control for omitted variables and measurement errors—show that a SRP factor enters the currency pricing kernel and is central to the pricing of risks inherent in a broad currency cross section of 60 portfolio excess returns. These results imply that skewness risk is a strong and priced source of currency risk.

The speed of stock price reaction to news exhibits substantial time variation. Higher risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries, lower passive ownership of stocks, and more informative news increase price responses to contemporaneous news; surprisingly, these interaction variables also increase price responses to lagged news (underreaction). A simple model with limited attention and three investor types (institutional, noninstitutional, and passive) predicts the observed variation in news responses. A long–short trading strategy based on news sentiment earns high returns, which increase when conditioning on the interaction variables. The interactions we document are robust to the choice of news source.

We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions across a broad range of areas in the empirical corporate finance literature. We assemble the necessary data and apply a single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd et al. to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems. We assess empirical performance across a wide spectrum of areas in corporate finance and indicate varying research opportunities for empiricists and theorists.

We present evidence of investors underreacting to the absence of events in financial markets. Routine-based insiders strategically choose to be silent when they possess private information not yet reflected in stock prices. Consistent with our hypothesis, insider silence following a routine sell (buy) predicts positive (negative) future returns, as well as fundamentals. The return predictability of insider silence is stronger among firms with a poor information environment and facing higher arbitrage costs, and a large fraction of abnormal returns concentrates on future earnings announcements. A long–short strategy that exploits insiders’ strategic silence behavior generates abnormal returns of 6% to 10% annually.

Using individual records of about 950,000 financial advisors, we find that the probability and intensity of financial advisor misconduct significantly increase after local newspaper closures. The impact is more pronounced in counties with a higher proportion of seniors, minorities, and individuals with lower education levels. Male advisors are more likely to commit misconduct following newspaper closures than female advisors. The sensitivity of advisors’ job turnover to misconduct decreases after closures, suggesting a lower cost of committing misconduct. Our evidence indicates that local newspapers play a distinct role in mitigating financial advisor misconduct, as media exposure raises the costs of misbehavior.

We use the 2015 Chinese stock market crash to study the effects of government stock purchases. The Chinese government purchased stocks to stabilize the markets through state-owned financial institutions known as the “National Team.” We find that the intervention led to reduced volatility and price informativeness. These impacts are driven by the disclosure of government portfolios. Consistent with investors having a stronger incentive to acquire government intervention information instead of fundamental news, we find reduced information production and information asymmetry following intervention disclosure. The article suggests that government stock purchases involve a trade-off between stability and informational efficiency.

Based on intraday data for a large cross section of individual stocks and newly developed econometric procedures, we decompose the realized variation for each of the stocks into separate so-called realized up and down semi-variance measures, or “good” and “bad” volatilities, associated with positive and negative high-frequency price increments, respectively. Sorting the individual stocks into portfolios based on their normalized good minus bad volatilities results in economically large and highly statistically significant differences in the subsequent portfolio returns. These differences remain significant after controlling for other firm characteristics and explanatory variables previously associated with the cross section of expected stock returns.