Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract It has been hypothesized that momentum might be rationally explained as a consequence of the cross-sectional variation of unconditional expected returns. Stocks with relatively high unconditional expected returns will on average outperform in both the portfolio formation period and in the subsequent holding period. We evaluate this explanation by first removing unconditional expected returns for each stock from raw returns and then testing for momentum in the resulting series. We measure the unconditional expected return on each stock as its mean return in the whole sample period. We find momentum effects vanish in demeaned returns.

Abstract We analyze the intertemporal stability of excess returns to technical trading rules in the foreign exchange market by conducting true, out-of-sample tests on previously studied rules. The excess returns of the 1970s and 1980s were genuine and not just the result of data mining. But these profit opportunities had disappeared by the early 1990s for filter and moving average rules. Returns to less-studied rules also have declined but have probably not completely disappeared. High volatility prevents precise estimation of mean returns. These regularities are consistent with the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo (2004)), but not with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

Abstract We develop measures of the management quality of firms and make use of a unique sample of hand-collected data to examine the relationship between the reputation and quality of a firm’s management and its financial and investment policies, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thus reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Given this, firms with better and more reputable managers will have more access to the equity market, so that we expect lower leverage ratios for these firms. In addition, they will have less need to signal using dividends, so that they will have lower dividend payout ratios. Further, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger net present value (NPV) for any given scale) and to implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with higher levels of investment. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses. Our direct tests of the relationship between management quality and asymmetric information also indicate that higher management quality leads to a reduction in the extent of information asymmetry facing a firm in the equity market.

Abstract Previous empirical studies on the “rationality” of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors but provide only limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. This paper tests for a specific form of forecast bias. In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Such a bias would be consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) or could arise from professional forecasters’ strategic incentives. We find broad-based and significant evidence for this form of bias, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. To investigate whether market participants’ expectations are influenced by this bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the forecast error and not to the component induced by anchoring, suggesting that expectations of market participants anticipate this bias embedded in expert forecasts.

Abstract Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.

Abstract What drives the compensation demanded by investors in risky bonds? Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) predict that one key factor is the time-varying negative correlation between interest rates and the yield spreads on corporate bonds. However, the effects of callability and taxes also need to be considered in empirical analyses. Canadian bonds have no tax effects, yet, after controlling for callability, the correlation between riskless interest rates and corporate bond spreads remains negligible. Our results provide support for reduced-form models that explicitly define a default hazard process and untie the relation between the firm’s asset value and default probability.

Abstract This paper estimates an internally consistent structural model that imposes cross-sectional restrictions on the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates, inflation, and output growth. Distinct from previous term structure settings, this model introduces both time-varying central tendencies and a stochastic conditional mean of output growth. The estimation of the model, which is based on U.S. data over a 1960 to 2005 sample period, provides reliable estimates for the implicit term structures of real interest rates, expected inflation rates, and inflation risk premia, as well as for expectations of macroeconomic variables. The model has better out-of-sample forecasting properties than a number of alternative models, and it contradicts the puzzling evidence that during the “Great Moderation” in inflation subsequent to the mid-1980s, the forecasting ability of structural models deteriorated with respect to atheoretic statistical models.

Abstract This paper uses investor-level data to provide direct evidence for an intuitive but surprisingly untested proposition that investors make larger investment mistakes when valuation uncertainty is higher and stocks are more difficult to value. Using multiple measures of valuation uncertainty and multiple behavioral bias proxies, I show that individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases when stocks are harder to value and when market-level uncertainty is higher. I also find that informed trading intensity is higher among stocks where individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases. Collectively, these results indicate that uncertainty at both stock and market levels amplifies individual investors’ behavioral biases and that relatively better informed investors attempt to exploit those biases.

Abstract We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. Our focus on board quality is motivated by the strong media criticism to which corporate boards and corporate America, in general, have been recently subjected. The results indicate that media releases of (noisy) information have significant economic consequences. In particular, media exposure of board ineffectiveness forces the targeted agents to take corrective actions and enhances shareholder wealth. Individual investors appear to react negatively to the media exposure, whereas investment firms act as if they anticipate the targeted firms’ corrective actions.

Abstract We uncover a positive stock market risk-return tradeoff after controlling for the covariance of market returns with the value premium. Fama and French (1996) conjecture that the value premium proxies for investment opportunities; therefore, by ignoring it, early specifications suffer from an omitted variable problem that causes a downward bias in the risk-return tradeoff estimation. We also document a positive relation between the value premium and its conditional variance, and the estimated conditional value premium is strongly countercyclical. The latter evidence supports the view that value is riskier than growth in bad times, when the price of risk is high.