Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We investigate whether compensation consultants recommend excessive pay to earn repeat business by studying consultant changes. Our results show consultants’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ to appropriately pay the CEO. Boards dismiss consultants making large pay recommendation errors, particularly positive ones. However, powerful or poorly monitored CEOs interfere with such disciplinary turnover, weakening the relation. Peer groups are more likely to change with new consultant appointments. New consultants are less likely to include highly paid executives in the compensation peer group and CEO pay falls following the change. Directors earn higher votes in annual elections when they replace compensation advisors.

Abstract We identify a parsimonious set of factors from a large pool of candidates for explaining hedge fund returns, ranging from equity market, anomaly, and trend-following factors to macroeconomic factors. The resulting 9-factor model, including five anomaly factors, outperforms existing hedge fund models both in sample and out of sample, with a significant reduction in alphas while showing substantial cross sectional performance heterogeneity. Further analysis based on fund holdings confirms the model’s ability to capture returns from arbitrage trading. Overall, the anomaly factors help quantify hedge fund strategies and risk exposures and improve fund performance evaluation.

Abstract We document firms often determine CEO equity grants based on a predetermined dollar value (value-based equity grant) instead of on the number of shares (share-based grant). Value-based equity grants weaken the relationship between stock performance and CEO equity pay, lower CEO portfolio delta, and slow firms’ investment in R&D. We find that retention pressure is a key reason for the use of value-based equity pay, while governance could also matter. Overall, this paper alerts boards to the unintended consequences of pursuing a target pay level or pay structure because such practices can lead to value-based equity grants in CEO compensation.

Abstract We find that a corrupt local environment amplifies the effects of financial distress. Following regional spikes in financial misconduct, credit becomes more difficult to obtain for local borrowers—even those not implicated themselves. This is particularly harmful for cash-constrained firms, which cut investment more sharply and lay off more workers during industry downturns. We also find that local clustering of financial misconduct is a risk factor for bankruptcy.

Abstract We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (vs. negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, bargaining hard, and inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality.

Abstract What are the benefits of access to the bond market for unlisted firms, and how does it affect their bank lending conditions? Using a regulatory reform that allowed unlisted firms to issue minibonds, we address these questions comparing new bank loans to issuers with concurrent loans to matched non-issuers. After the first minibond issuance, issuers obtain lower interest rates on bank loans of similar maturity, largely reflecting a shift in the seniority structure of corporate debt, and reduce the use of bank loans while increasing their total financial debt. They also increase turnover, total and fixed assets, particularly intangible assets.

Abstract We develop a real options model in which an entrepreneur facing ambiguity makes optimal investment and financing decisions for an innovation project. We introduce jumps in innovation returns and model investors’ aversion to ambiguity in both diffusion and jump risks. Debt accelerates investment by lowering the threshold and shortening expected waiting time, thereby increasing project value. This effect strengthens under greater ambiguity, offering a novel rationale for why debt—not equity—fosters innovation. Our results provide a coherent explanation for recent empirical findings on debt’s role in innovation and contribute to the broader literature on investment under uncertainty.

Abstract We analyze how corporate direct investments in fintech startups affect startup performance and that of investing firms. Corporate investment in fintech startups is associated with a greater likelihood of successful exit, more and higher-quality innovation, and a greater inflow of high-quality inventors. A stacked difference-in-differences analysis shows that direct investments enhance the operating performance and equity-market valuation of corporate investors in the financial services sector, but not those in the nonfinancial sector. We establish two channels that drive fintech startups’ performance improvements: strategic alliance formation between investors and startups, and enhanced startup monitoring by corporate investors.

Abstract In 2017, the European Union Emissions Trading System underwent a policy intervention that resulted in a surge in carbon prices. Using this setting as a quasi-natural experiment, we focus on employment, productivity, and emission outcomes among covered enterprises. Results show that emission-intensive private firms, particularly those with financial constraints, are more likely to downsize by divesting production assets, reducing both workforce and emissions. Smaller, cash-strapped listed firms are also prone to downsize by decreasing their operating leverage while maintaining emission output and asset levels. Positive productivity outcomes indicate that both private and listed firms become leaner postintervention.

Abstract This article provides the first comprehensive evidence that the return extrapolation behavior of investors leads to biases in the expectations of volatility. Lower past returns are associated with higher expectations of volatility when using the physical, risk-neutral, and survey measures to estimate volatility expectations. Consistent with the return extrapolation framework, recent past returns have a larger impact than distant past returns on volatility expectations. Biases in volatility expectations are i) distinct from extrapolating past realized volatility, ii) asymmetrically induced by recent past negative returns, and iii) lead investors to pay more to insure against the perceived higher expected volatility.