Knowledge that Transforms

The average firm going public or issuing new equity underperforms the market in the long run. This underperformance could be related to the endogeneity of the number of new issues if new issues cluster after periods of high abnormal returns on new issues. In such a case, ex post measures of new issue abnormal returns may be negative on average, despite the absence of ex ante abnormal returns. We evaluate this endogeneity problem in event studies of long-run performance. We argue that it is unlikely that the endogeneity of the number of new issues explains the long-run underperformance of equity issues.

This paper investigates whether corporate payout policy is associated with insiders' share holdings and their tax preferences. We find that insider ownership and the implied tax liabilities are positively related to a firm's propensity to employ share repurchases. Firms with higher levels of or greater increases in insider ownership prefer stock repurchases to cash dividends. This relation is more significant in years when dividends were more tax disadvantaged relative to capital gains. Our findings are robust to the endogeneity of insider ownership and the inclusion of various control variables such as firm size, permanence of cash flows, growth opportunities, institutional ownership, and executive stock options. Overall, our results suggest that personal tax considerations from insiders affect corporate payout decisions.

A number of recent studies finds two asymmetries in dependence structures in international equity markets; specifically, dependence tends to be high in both highly volatile markets and in bear markets. In this paper, a further investigation of asymmetric dependence structures in international equity markets is performed by using the Markov switching model and copula theory. Combining these two theories enables me to model dependence structures with sufficient flexibility. Using this flexible framework, I indeed find that there are two distinct regimes in the U. S.-U. K. market. I also show that for the U. S.-U. K. market the bear regime is better described by an asymmetric copula with lower tail dependence with clear rejection of the Markov switching multivariate normal model. In addition, I show that ignorance of this further asymmetry in bear markets is very costly for risk management. Lastly, I conduct a similar analysis for other G7 countries, where I find other cases in which the use of a Markov switching multivariate normal model would be inappropriate.

We examine the penalties imposed on the 585 firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978–2002, which we track through November 15, 2005. The penalties imposed on firms through the legal system average only $23.5 million per firm. The penalties imposed by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate of the reputational penalty—which we define as the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs—is over 7.5 times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system. For each dollar that a firm misleadingly inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $3.08. Of this additional loss, $0.36 is due to expected legal penalties and $2.71 is due to lost reputation. In firms that survive the enforcement process, lost reputation is even greater at $3.83. In the cross section, the reputation loss is positively related to measures of the firm's reliance on implicit contracts. This evidence belies a widespread belief that financial misrepresentation is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputation losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books.

Using data on all employees at listed companies in Taiwan, we find that the bias toward employer stocks is generic to individual investor decision making, but not limited to retirement plans. Seventy-one percent of the sample employees invest in employer stocks and employer stocks make up on average 47% of employee equity portfolios. The underdiversification resulting from the bias toward employer stocks is very costly. Holding current portfolio risk constant, employees forego 4.89% per annum in raw returns by investing in employer stocks, which represents 39.74% of their average 1998 salary income. Our findings have important implications for social security reform and retirement account management.

We examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to board composition or subsequent merger activity.

We find evidence that conflicts of interest arising from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) relations influence analysts' recommendations, corroborating regulators' and practitioners' suspicions in a setting, i.e., M&A relations, not previously examined in research on analyst conflicts. In addition, the M&A context allows us to disentangle the conflict of interest effect from selection bias. We find that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors upgrade acquirer stocks around M&A deals, even around all-cash deals, in which selection bias is unlikely. Also consistent with conflict of interest but not selection bias, target-affiliated analysts publish optimistic reports about acquirers after, but not before, the exchange ratio of an all-stock deal is set.

Using stock transactions data along with detailed stockholdings for a comprehensive sample of U.S. actively managed equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2002, this paper empirically examines the effect of liquidity and investment style on the relation between fund size and fund performance. Consistent with Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), I find a significant inverse relation between fund size and fund performance. Further, this inverse relation is stronger among funds that hold less liquid portfolios. The inverse relation between fund size and fund performance is also more pronounced among growth and high turnover funds that tend to have high demands for immediacy. Overall, this paper's findings suggest that liquidity is an important reason why fund size erodes performance.

Using a unique insurance dataset for a sample of Chinese publicly listed companies for the period 1997 through 2003, this study tests the simultaneous linkages between debt capacity, cost of debt, and corporate property insurance. Our results suggest that, on the one hand, a higher cost of debt appears to motivate the use of more property insurance, but high leverage alone does not lead to the purchase of more property insurance. The latter finding might reflect the unique institutional setting of China, for example, where there is a low chanceof legally enforced company liquidation. Also, there is evidence that leverage can interact with tangible assets intensity and exert a positive conjoint effect on the corporate purchase ofproperty insurance. On the other hand, we find evidence that supports that property insurance helps expand insuring firms' debt capacity and helps lower their borrowing costs. However, themoderate evidence on the cost reduction effect suggests that lowering the borrowing cost is likely to be a concern secondary to facilitating corporate borrowing and thereby expanding debt capacity in corporate property insurance decisions in China. Overall, we conclude that debt capacity, cost of debt, and corporate insurance appear to be simultaneously related.

This Paper explores the importance and price implications of style investing by institutional investors in the stock market. To analyze styles, we assign stocks to deciles or segments across three style dimensions: size, value/growth, and sector. we find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate and sector. We find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate across style groupings more intensively than across random stock groupings. In addition, we show that own segment style inflows and refurns positively forecast future stock returns, which distant segament style inflows and returns forecast negatively. We argue that behavioral theories play a role in explaining these results.