Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We present a theory of the linkages between corporate governance, corporate finance, and the real sector of an economy. Using a structural model of industry equilibrium with endogenous entry, we show that poor corporate governance leads to low levels of competition, and to firms with high insider ownership and leverage. In contrast, good corporate governance promotes the adoption of more efficient technologies and development of sectors more exposed to moral hazard. We use our model to study equity market liberalization, and we show that liberalizations facilitate entry and adoption of more productive technologies, especially in countries with good corporate governance.

Abstract This study examines how the institutional environment influences capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms in 39 developed and developing countries. We find that a country’s legal and tax system, corruption, and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios. Specifically, firms in more corrupt countries and those with weaker laws tend to use more debt, especially short-term debt; explicit bankruptcy codes and deposit insurance are associated with higher leverage and more long-term debt. More debt is used in countries where there is a greater tax gain from leverage.

Abstract DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) report that naïve diversification dominates mean-variance optimization in out-of-sample asset allocation tests. Our analysis suggests that this is largely due to their research design, which focuses on portfolios that are subject to high estimation risk and extreme turnover. We find that mean-variance optimization often outperforms naïve diversification, but turnover can erode its advantage in the presence of transaction costs. To address this issue, we develop 2 new methods of mean-variance portfolio selection (volatility timing and reward-to-risk timing) that deliver portfolios characterized by low turnover. These timing strategies outperform naïve diversification even in the presence of high transaction costs.

Abstract Well-performing default predictions show good discrimination and calibration. Discrimination is the ability to separate defaulters from nondefaulters. Calibration is the ability to make unbiased forecasts. I derive novel discrimination and calibration statistics to verify forecasts expressed in terms of probability under dependent observations. The test statistics’ asymptotic distributions can be derived in analytic form. Not accounting for cross correlation can result in the rejection of actually well-performing predictions, as shown in an empirical application. I demonstrate that forecasting errors must be serially uncorrelated. As a consequence, my multiperiod tests are statistically consistent.

Abstract This paper analyzes the loss allocation to first, second, and third loss positions in European collateralized debt obligation transactions. The quality of the underlying asset pool plays a predominant role for the loss allocation. A lower asset pool quality induces the originator to take a higher first loss position, but, in a synthetic transaction, a smaller third loss position. The share of expected default losses, borne by the first loss position, is largely independent of asset pool quality but lower in securitizations of corporate loans than in those of corporate bonds. Originators with a good rating and low Tobin’s Q prefer synthetic transactions.

Abstract This paper examines the impact of financial sponsor competition on corporate buyers. We find that corporate acquirers who purchase targets that financial buyers also bid on outperform corporate acquirers who buy targets bid on by corporate firms only. Deal characteristics, acquirer abilities, and observable target characteristics cannot explain this difference in returns. Corporate acquirers have higher returns when they follow a first bid by a financial buyer rather than a first bid by another corporate buyer. The results suggest that financial bidders identify targets with high potential for value improvement and winning corporate bidders are competent in exploiting this potential.

Abstract I analyze optimal loan modification schemes in a stochastic home price and stochastic interest-rate environment. Lenders maximize loan values by managing the borrower’s option to default on the loan and prepayment option. Given negative equity, controlling for the borrower’s ability to pay, rate reductions and maturity extensions result in a higher probability of redefault by homeowners even after modification of their loans. In contrast, loan write-downs (the Principal Principle), not a favored recipe, are value maximizing for the lender. A shared-appreciation mortgage enhances the ability to pay, mitigates adverse selection, and reduces the present value of expected deadweight foreclosure costs.

Abstract We develop a new methodology to estimate abnormal performance and risk exposure of nontraded assets from cash flows. Our methodology extends the standard internal rate of return approach to a dynamic setting. The small-sample properties are validated using a simulation study. We apply the method to a sample of 958 private equity funds. For venture capital funds, we find a high market beta and underperformance before and after fees. For buyout funds, we find a relatively low market beta and no evidence for outperformance. We find that self-reported net asset values significantly overstate fund values for mature and inactive funds.

Abstract This study uses Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) method to separate active institutional investors from passive ones and shows that active investors can alleviate the anomalous comovement of stock returns. Focusing on 2 events linked to the excess comovement anomaly, Standard & Poor’s 500 Index additions and stock splits, I find that if an event stock has more active institutional investors trading in the post-event period, the anomalous comovement effect disappears. In contrast, if an event stock experiences a massive exit of active investors, this anomaly persists. The exit of active institutional investors also results in a strong price synchronicity effect.

Abstract When managing risk, frequently only imperfect hedging instruments are at hand. We show how to optimally cross-hedge risk when the spread between the hedging instrument and the risk is stationary . For linear risk positions we derive explicit formulas for the hedge error, and for nonlinear positions we show how to obtain numerically efficient estimates. Finally, we demonstrate that even in cases with no clear-cut decision concerning the stationarity of the spread, it is better to allow for mean reversion of the spread rather than to neglect it.