Knowledge that Transforms

We test for the presence of a systematic tail risk premium in the cross section of expected returns by applying a measure of the sensitivity of assets to extreme market downturns, the tail beta. Empirically, historical tail betas help predict the future performance of stocks in extreme market downturns. During a market crash, stocks with historically high tail betas suffer losses that are approximately 2 to 3 times larger than their low-tail-beta counterparts. However, we find no evidence of a premium associated with tail betas. The theoretically additive and empirically persistent tail betas can help assess portfolio tail risks.

I develop two new types of portfolio efficiency when returns are predictable. The first type maximizes the unconditional Sharpe ratio of excess returns and differs from unconditional efficiency unless the safe asset return is constant over time. The second type maximizes conditional mean-variance preferences and differs from unconditional efficiency unless, additionally, the maximum conditional Sharpe ratio is constant. Using stock data, I quantify and test their performance differences with respect to unconditionally and fixed-weight efficient returns. I also show the relevance of the two new portfolio strategies to test conditional asset pricing models.

This study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

We examine the link between bank competition and financial stability using the recent financial crisis as the setting. We utilize variation in banking competition at the state level and find that banks facing less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities, more likely to face regulatory intervention, and more likely to fail. Focusing on the real estate market, we find that states with less competition had higher rates of mortgage approval, experienced greater inflation in housing prices before the crisis, and experienced a steeper decline in housing prices during the crisis. Overall, our study is consistent with greater competition increasing financial stability.

Models that examine investors’ motivations to trade often make opposite predictions about the relation between trading decisions and past returns. We find that, in the aggregate, both buyer- and seller-initiated trades increase with past returns. The difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trades is negatively related to short horizon returns but positively related to returns over longer horizons. Tax-loss-related seller-initiated trades in December and January are accompanied by increased buyer-initiated trades. Past returns significantly affect trading decisions, and these findings are consistent with a number of different models of trading behavior.

We investigate how government interventions such as blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations affect banking competition. These issues are critical for stability, access to finance, and economic growth. Exploiting cross-country and cross-time variation in the timing of interventions and accounting for their nonrandomness, we document that liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations trigger large increases in competition. We also find some more nuanced evidence that zombie banks’ market shares in crisis countries evolve together with interventions. A higher frequency of interventions coincides with greater zombie bank presence, and increases in competition are larger when zombie banks occupy bigger market shares.

Building on the growing literature on interfirm links and limited attention, we find evidence of return predictability across alliance partners. A long–short portfolio sorted on lagged returns of strategic alliance partners provides a return of 89 basis points per month that is robust to a number of specifications. Investor inattention and limits to arbitrage may be the source of the underreaction of a firm’s returns to that of its partners.

In a sample of underwritten seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), issuers with boards dominated by independent directors experience higher abnormal announcement returns than issuers with boards dominated by insiders. Firm size, transparency, and other governance characteristics do not explain the effect of board independence. The positive relation between board independence and SEO returns is more pronounced for firms with lower monitoring costs and more severe financial constraints. The evidence suggests that independent directors have a positive effect because of their role in controlling both shareholder–manager conflicts (monitoring the use of funds) and current–new shareholder conflicts (certification of the issue’s value).

We relate Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction to asset pricing, thereby offering a novel explanation of size and value premia. We argue that small-value firms must offer higher expected returns to compensate for the risk posed by serendipitous invention activity, whereas large-growth stocks provide protection against creative destruction and receive expected return discounts. A 2-factor model that accounts for creative-destruction risk effectively explains the cross-sectional return variation of size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios. The estimated risk compensations associated with creative destruction are substantial and statistically significant, indicating their relevance for asset pricing.

We examine the relation between the agglomeration of firms around big cities and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We find a positive relation among the metropolitan size of a firm’s headquarters, the total and equity portion of its CEO’s pay, and the quality of CEO educational attainment. We also find that CEOs gradually increase their human capital in major metropolitan areas and are rewarded for this upon relocation to smaller cities. Taken together, the results suggest that urban agglomeration reflects local network spillovers and faster learning of skilled individuals, for which firms are willing to pay a premium and which are therefore important factors in CEO compensation.