We examine the association between margin requirements and the market’s efficiency in incorporating firm-specific and market-level public news. Combining the Fed’s 22 changes in margin requirements with a hand-collected sample of earnings announcements between 1934 and 1975, we show that higher margin requirements induce greater delay in incorporating earnings information into prices. We draw similar conclusions when we analyze the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) price delay measure, as well as indirect measures of leverage constraints over recent years. Further tests suggest that, despite the Fed’s expressed intent to curtail excess speculation, higher margin requirements restrict trading by arbitrageurs more than noise traders.

Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors.

We introduce a new approach to estimating long-term aggregate discount rates using the cross section of earnings and book values to explain current stock prices and extract expected market returns. The proposed discount rate measure is countercyclical. Shocks to it account for nearly half of historical market return variation; in contrast, shocks to other discount rate measures account for no more than 2%. It dominates other measures in explaining time-series variation in returns on duration-sorted portfolios and delivers out-of-sample predictability that exceeds that afforded by other expected return measures and predictive variables. It also performs well in international equity markets.