The paper provides sufficient conditions under which a nonrandom economic variable specific to some asset (the dependent variable) can be represented as a linear combination of the betas of some random characteristics of the asset (the independent variables) with some economy-wide factors. This generalizes Ross' APT that proves the above in the case where the dependent variables are expected returns and the independent variables are returns. This generalization will provide a theoretical basis for many existing multibeta relationships beyond the setting of asset pricing models and, thus, motivate their wider use in empirical and theoretical research.

The Arrow-Debreu approach to general equilibrium in an economy has been recognized as one of the most general and conceptually elegant frameworks for the study of financial problems under uncertainty [2], [9]. Equally well known is its elusiveness when it comes to ready application to practical problems (like capital budgeting) or empirical testing. (See [6], [15]–[18].) However, some recent research (see [1], [3], [6], [12]–[16], [18], and [19]) has made a serious attempt to put the state-preference theoretic model in an operational setting. Breeden and Litzenberger [6] have developed an interesting approach to derive constructively the prices of elementary Arrow-Debreu securities from the prices of call options on aggregate consumption. Banz and Miller [3] use a similar technique to value capital budgeting projects based on values for state-contingent claims computed from prices of call options written on the market portfolio. The “supershare†securities proposed by Hakansson [14]–[16] and related work by Garman [13], Ross [24], etc., have also served to give the so-called “state-contingent†approach a practical flavor.

In the Arrow-Debreu approach to uncertainty it has been recognized that an inadequate number of markets in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency. Several researchers have studied the allocative inefficiencies resulting from incomplete markets, i.e., when the number of independent securities is less than the number of states and therefore the state-space cannot be “spanned” by those securities. In a situation where the number of primitive assets is inadequate to span the state-space, the new spanning opportunities opened up by derived assets written on the primitives is an interesting question.

We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.

We find that an increase in a firm’s incentives to use trade secrets to protect its intellectual property results in a more actively managed capital structure. Exploiting U.S. states’ adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a positive “shock” in the protection afforded to trade secrets, we find that firms covered by the Act reduce debt levels while increasing investments in intangibles. Additional tests suggest that firms fund these financing and investment activities by issuing more equity. Consistent with an increase in overall intangibility magnifying contracting problems with creditors, we find that covered firms experience higher costs of debt.

We examine the relation between the agglomeration of firms around big cities and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We find a positive relation among the metropolitan size of a firm’s headquarters, the total and equity portion of its CEO’s pay, and the quality of CEO educational attainment. We also find that CEOs gradually increase their human capital in major metropolitan areas and are rewarded for this upon relocation to smaller cities. Taken together, the results suggest that urban agglomeration reflects local network spillovers and faster learning of skilled individuals, for which firms are willing to pay a premium and which are therefore important factors in CEO compensation.

We construct a measure ( fLMA ) of the extent to which neighboring firms hire similar types of workers, based on the similarity between the labor profile of a firm and that of its locality. We show that a firm’s innovation is positively related to fLMA. The enhanced labor mobility induced by higher fLMA is an important channel for this positive relation. This relation is stronger when firms have increased outside job opportunities for employees, increased knowledge spillovers via coworkership, and more employee stock options. Innovation is higher when intellectual property ownership is with employers, not employees. This effect increases in fLMA.

We document that a firm’s culture, specifically, its religiosity, affects its cost of debt. Firms in higher-religiosity counties have higher credit ratings and lower debt costs. The impact of religiosity is stronger for firms with greater information asymmetry and during recessions. Further, religiosity has additional explanatory power for the cost of bank loans (but not the cost of public bonds) beyond its impact through ratings. This supports the argument that banks have superior abilities in pricing soft information, such as corporate culture. Finally, the impact of religiosity is stronger when the lender is a small bank.