This paper examines rational expectations in the Treasury bill market from 1961 to 1988 with a risk premium specified to be proportional to the volatility of excess returns using instrumental variables. From 1961 to 1972 and from 1972 to 1979, rational expectations cannot be rejected, and both the predictive power of the yield curve and the risk premium are highly significant. By contrast, with just a constant risk premium and with a risk premium proxied by moving averages of absolute interest rate changes, rational expectations are rejected for each subperiod, and the yield curve has significant predictive information only from 1972 to 1979.

A majority of corporate zero-coupon bonds includes a call provision, giving the firm the right to call the bond at par value. In this paper, we investigate whether or not it is optimal for the firm to call such a bond for refunding purposes, taking into consideration the effect of corporate taxes. We find that it is not optimal to refund the bond as long as the corporate tax rate is less than 50 percent. We find that a significantly higher proportion of callable zero-coupon bonds, compared to noncallables, has restrictive financing covenants, suggesting that the call feature is included to provide flexibility at a low cost for future recapitalizations as the firm's investment opportunities change.

Shantaram P. Hegde, Robert E. Miller, Market-Making in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stocks: An Empirical Analysis, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 75-90