Knowledge that Transforms

Participants in labor market experiments are aware that the experiments run for a limited amount of time. Thus behavior during a temporary experiment will be different than if the experimental change in constraints confronting participants were permanent. In evaluating changes in policy, however, the response to permanent changes is of primary interest. The paper analyzes conditions under which permanent responses can be inferred from data on temporary experiments.

This paper formulates and estimates a model for the determination of employer and union demand for multiemployer (vs. single employer) bargaining units. Utility-maximizing, risk-averse firms and unions are both assumed to weigh the impact of each type of bargaining unit on the expected level and variability of profits and wages, respectively. The model is tested on a 1975 sample of 3,486 individual collective bargaining agreements. Because either party can generally leave a multiemployer unit without the other party's consent, a partially observed bivariate probit model is used to estimate demand for structure. It is found that the forgone profits due to a multiemployer unit (relative to a single-firm unit) lower firm demands for this type of unit, while forgone wages in a multiemployer unit (relative to a single-firm unit) lower union demand for this type of unit.

This paper extends the theory of self-selection to circumstances in which economic agents have some access to markets. We use the analysis to explain the existence of multidimensional compensation packages in the presence of limited (re)marketability. Employment contracts that include fringe benefits are prominent examples of such multidimensional packages.

This paper develops a theory of layoffs in an intertemporal setting in which job separations may occur in each of several successive periods. Theoretical analysis of temporary layoffs in previous studies has been limited to models in which the layoffs occur only in the final period of the model. This multiperiod implicit contract framework enables us to identify distinguishing characteristics of temporary and permanent layoffs that were heretofore blurred or distorted in previous contract analyses.

The paper considers an industry in which individual output follows a stochastic growth process with a cumulative effect. It analyzes the roles of labor mobility and capital market conditions in the determination of wage contracts. Positive costs of mobility are shown to be necessary for the provision of wage and employment insurance when workers have no access to the capital market. When insurance is provided, wages grow less than average productivity. If the capital market is perfect, wage insurance will be provided even in the absence of costs of mobility. In this case, wages grow faster than average productivity.

This paper proposes a simple, new diagnostic indicating the presence of uncorrected heterogeneity in exponential models of duration. The use of the diagnostic is illustrated in an example dealing with unemployment duration in the DIME data. The diagnostic is seen to supplement the information on the fit given by the maximized likelihood value.

This paper examines trends in union membership during the twentieth century. The hypothesis is advanced that the provision of certain social welfare benefits by government substitutes for the private provision by unions, thereby reducing the attractiveness of union membership. The empirical implications of this hypothesis are examined using time-series data on aggregate union membership for the period 1904-80 and using pooled state data for the period 1964-80. These latter data are used to examine the effect of departures from the traditional doctrine of "employment at will." Both the time-series and the cross-section evidence suggest that government supply of "union-like" services reduces union membership.