This paper partially fills a theoretical void by developing an integrated model of the various branches of the medical community. A consistent and general framework is adopted to analyze equilibrium within the market for medical services under a stylized form of socialized medicine, without invoking demand shifting. The optimization problem faced by each agent is specified and the equilibrium is defined. The effect of various parameter changes on the market for medical services is analyzed. The predictions are not contradicted by the stylized facts.

How does personal exposure to economic conditions affect individual human capital investment choices? Focusing on bachelor’s degree recipients, we find that cohorts exposed to higher unemployment rates during typical schooling years select majors that earn higher wages, have better employment prospects, and lead to work in a related field. Conditional on expected earnings, recessions also encourage women to enter male-dominated fields, and students of both genders pursue more difficult majors. We conclude that economic environments change how students select majors, and we find evidence that students who respond to the business cycle enjoy earnings typical of their new majors.

The 1918–47 employee records of the Ford Motor Company provide a rare opportunity to study a firm willing to hire black workers when similar firms would not. The evidence suggests that Ford did profit from discrimination elsewhere, but not by paying blacks less than whites. An apparent “wage‐equity constraint” prevailed, resulting in virtually no racial variation in wages inside Ford. An implication was that blacks quit Ford jobs less often than whites, holding working conditions constant. Arbitrage profit came from exploiting this nonwage margin, as Ford placed blacks in hot, dangerous foundry jobs where quit rates were generally high.

The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor‐market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer’s net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.

This article compares various measures of on-the-job training, from a new source that matches establishments and workers, allowing the authors to compare the responses of employers and employees to identical training questions. Establishments report 25 percent more hours of training than do workers, although workers and establishments report similar incidence rates of training. Both establishment and worker measures agree that there is much more informal training than formal training. Further, informal training is measured about as accurately as formal training. Finally, the authors show that measurement error reduces substantially the observed effect of training, in particular the effect of training on productivity growth. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

A major issue in the analysis of unemployment durations concerns distinguishing genuine duration dependence of the exit rate out of unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity. We present a method for the nonparametric estimation of both phenomena, designed to be applicable to time-series data on aggregate outflows from different duration classes. The model explicitly takes into account that individual exit rates are affected by the business cycle and by seasonal effects. The method is applied to U.S. data. We find diverging duration effects among black and white individuals. However, except for white males, duration dependence is dominated by unobserved heterogeneity.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the nonunion wage differential consists of two effects. The first represents the differential between the wage of a nonunion worker in a collective bargaining unit and the wage paid to a comparable worker not covered by a bargaining agreement. This effect arises from the monopoly power of organized labor. The second is the wage differential between union and nonunion workers in collective bargaining units. This latter effect is attributed to economic benefits that unionism brings to its members. Empirical evidence is presented in support of both effects.

We analyze the impact of Ford Motor Company’s compensation practices on the Detroit-area labor market from 1918 to 1947. Previous studies imply that Ford paid race-independent wages, but its Black workers were sorted into undesirable departments. We extend these results using propensity score reweighting of census data and Ford’s records and confirm that Ford paid equal wages. We then develop a search model with discriminatory and equal wage firms to assess the impact of Ford’s policy on the larger labor market. Calibrated simulations suggest that Ford may have reduced the wage gap in southeastern Michigan by as much as 50%.

Workers in cities earn 33% more than their nonurban counterparts. A large amount of evidence suggests that this premium is not just the result of higher ability workers living in cities, which means that cities make workers more productive. Evidence on migrants and the cross effect between urban status and experience implies that a significant fraction of the urban wage premium accrues to workers over time and stays with them when they leave cities. Therefore, a portion of the urban wage premium is a wage growth, not a wage level, effect. This evidence suggests that cities speed the accumulation of human capital. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.

Using data on union certification elections, we estimate the impact of unionization on firms' investment behavior. Employing both a standard q model and an “investment surprises” technique, we find that union certification significantly reduces investment in the year following the election. We find that a winning certification election has, on average, about the same effect on investment in the year following the event as would—given the elasticity measures taken from the public finance literature—a 33 percentage‐point increase in the corporate tax. The magnitude of the response in years further away from the election is less certain.