This article presents evidence about the effects of dismissals‐for‐cause requirements, a specific component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. I study a quasi‐experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the 12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for cause, eight did not apply to small firms. Using matched employer‐employee longitudinal data and difference‐in‐differences methods, I examine the impact of that differentiated change in firing costs upon several variables. The results do not indicate robust effects on job or worker flows, although some estimates suggest an increase in hirings. However, firms that gain flexibility in their dismissals exhibit sizable increases in their relative performance. This finding suggests that reducing firing costs of the type studied here increases workers’ effort.

I argue for increased reliance on non–U.S. data and policy evaluations to understand basic labor market parameters and to predict the effects of changes in U.S. labor market policies. Foreign experiences generate exogenous shocks to labor costs that create unusual opportunities to measure impacts on labor demand. Foreign policies often provide more variation in the underlying parameters in systems that are often structured like their American counterparts. Foreign data sets are often larger and better suited to inferring behavior. An empirical examination shows the effect of author's location, data set, and journal on the research's subsequent impact.

This article evaluates the quality of workers' information regarding pension offerings using both administrative records and worker reports of pension provisions. Missing and incorrect information is wide-spread. Unionized employees, higher income workers, better educated workers, and those with seniority are better informed about their pensions. There are also demographic differences: minorities have less pension knowledge than whites, but women are better informed than men along several pension dimensions. Myopia about pension incentive structures is troubling since workers may save or consume suboptimally, change jobs, or retire earlier than they would have if equipped with better pension information.

This article is concerned with hours worked per employee in unionized labor markets. First the determination of hours is examined in the context of various bargaining models and, in the process, these models are nested in a general framework. Then cross-section and time-series data are drawn on to quantify the effects of unionism on hours worked. The time-series data from 1920 to 1980 imply a negative impact of unionism on full-time hours while cross-section data for 1978 suggest some notable differences in both the direction and the magnitude of this impact across occupations and industries.

This paper uses experimental data from the Head Start Impact Study (HSIS) combined with nonexperimental data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) to study the performance of nonexperimental estimators for evaluating Head Start program impacts. The estimators studied include parametric cross-section and difference-in-differences regression estimators and nonparametric cross-section and difference-in-differences matching estimators. The estimators are used to generate program impacts on cognitive achievement test scores, child health measures, parenting behaviors, and parent labor market outcomes. Some of the estimators closely reproduce the experimental results, but a priori it would be difficult to know whether the estimator works well for any particular outcome. Pre-program exogeneity tests eliminate some outcomes and estimators with the worst biases, but estimators/outcomes with substantial biases pass the tests. The difference-in-differences matching estimator exhibits the best performance in terms of low bias values and capturing the pattern of statistically significant treatment effects. However, the variation in bias is greater across outcomes examined than across methods.

We organize an empirical analysis of Russian wage arrears around hypotheses concerning incentives for firms to pay late and for workers to tolerate late payment. Nationally representative household panel data matched with employer data show that arrears are positively related to firm age, size, state ownership, and declining performance. Constrained multinomial logit estimates reveal intrafirm variation related to job tenure and small shareholdings in the firm. Wage arrears, unlike wage cuts, have a theoretically ambiguous effect on workers' quit behavior, and we show empirically that the effect varies negatively with the extent of the practice in the local labor market.

The authors propose models with an ascriptive characteristic generating earnings differentials and causing sectoral sorting, allowing them to distinguish among sources producing such differentials. They use longitudinal data on a large sample of graduates from one law school and measure beauty by rating matriculation photographs. Better-looking attorneys who graduated in the 1970s earned more than others after five years of practice, an effect that grew with experience. Attorneys in the private sector are better-looking than those in the public sector, differences that rise with age. These results support theories of dynamic sorting and customer behavior.

We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short run (and may even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat.

We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike, or it can continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive, because of low unemployment or a real wage drop. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for negotiations from 1970 to 1989. We find support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981.

The long-term decline in US workers’ attempts to organize labor unions accelerated after 2000. We find that the swift rise of imports from China arising from a change in trade policy accounts for nearly all of this post-2000 acceleration: union certification elections decreased substantially among workers in manufacturing industries directly exposed to imports, but also among workers indirectly exposed through their local labor market. Consistent with a simple model of workers’ decision to seek union representation, direct exposure lowered the expected wage gain from unionization, whereas indirect exposure increased the cost of job loss—both of which discourage organizing.