Knowledge that Transforms

This paper argues that several of the poor labor market outcomes observed in the Great Recession can be traced back to a change in the demand pattern for skilled workers that started with the tech bust of 2000. In particular, we show that around the year 2000, the demand for cognitive tasks underwent a reversal. In response, high-skilled workers moved down the occupational ladder and increasingly displaced lower-educated workers in less skill-intensive jobs. While these effects were present before the financial crisis of 2008, they became more obvious after jobs associated with the housing bubble disappeared.

Authors often add covariates to a base model sequentially either to test a particular coefficient’s “robustness” or to account for the “effects” on this coefficient of adding covariates. This is problematic, due to sequence sensitivity when added covariates are intercorrelated. Using the omitted variables bias formula, I construct a conditional decomposition that accounts for various covariates’ role in moving base regressors’ coefficients. I also provide a consistent covariance formula. I illustrate this conditional decomposition with NLSY data in an application that exhibits sequence sensitivity. Related extensions include instrumental variables, the fact that my decomposition nests the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, and a Hausman test result.

We compare the income and wage trajectories of women to those of their male partners before and after parenthood. Focusing on the within-couple gap allows us to control for both observed and unobserved attributes of the spouse and to estimate both short- and long-term effects of entering parenthood. We find that 15 years after the first child has been born, the male-female gender gaps in income and wages have increased by 32 and 10 percentage points, respectively. In line with a collective labor supply model, the magnitude of these effects depends on counterfactual relative incomes or wages within the family.

Even before the Great Recession, US employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall US job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.