This paper obtains comparable estimates of the effect of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on labor supply throughout the unemployment spell and over the business cycle using a regression kink design and 20 years of administrative data from California. For a given unemployment duration, the behavioral effect of UI benefit levels on labor supply does not vary with the business cycle from 2002 to 2019. However, due to increased coverage from extensions in benefit durations, the duration elasticity of UI benefits rises during recessions. The behavioral effect during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic is substantially lower at all unemployment durations.

We study the relationship among occupational employment, occupational wages, and wage inequality. In all occupations, entrants and leavers earn less than stayers, suggesting negative selection effects for growing occupations and positive effects for shrinking ones. We estimate a model of occupational prices and skills that includes specific skill accumulation and endogenous switching. Contrary to uncorrected wages, prices and employment growth are positively related. Forty percent of selection is due to age, as entrants and leavers have had less time to accumulate skills. The remainder is Roy-type selection. Skill prices establish a quantitative connection of occupational changes with surging wage inequality.

We explore how much borrowers value student debt relief in the setting of the federal Teacher Loan Forgiveness program, which cancels between $5,000 and $17,500 in debt for teachers at high-need schools. Using both quasi-experimental evidence and a randomized controlled trial, we find that neither eligibility nor a targeted information intervention affects employment decisions. Information was found to increase application and receipt rates for teachers who had achieved eligibility. Evidence from contingent valuation surveys suggests that teachers do in general value debt relief. Incorporating qualitative evidence, we conclude that take-up may be constrained by program complexity and administrative barriers.