I assess the long‐run implications for children of growing up in a unilateral divorce environment, which increases the ease of divorce by not requiring the explicit consent of both partners. Using 40 years of census data to exploit the variation across states and over time in changes in divorce regulation, I confirm that unilateral divorce regulations do significantly increase the incidence of divorce. Adults who were exposed to unilateral divorce regulations as children are less well educated, have lower family incomes, marry earlier but separate more often, and have higher odds of adult suicide.

I provide new evidence on the incidence of payroll taxation by examining the experience of Chile before and after the privatization of its Social Security system. This policy change led to a sharp exogenous reduction in the payroll tax burden on Chilean firms; on average, payroll tax rates fell by 25% over 6 years. Using data from a census of manufacturing firms, I estimate that the incidence of payroll taxation is fully on wages, with no effect on employment. This finding is robust to a variety of empirical approaches to the problem of measurement error in firm‐level measures of taxes/worker.

Previous research on unemployment insurance (UI) has emphasized the program's effect on individual search behavior. This state‐contingent income may also reduce the labor supply of family members during the unemployment spell. We investigate this question within the context of wives' labor supply responses to their husbands' unemployment spells. We find strong “crowdout” of this form of family self‐insurance; our estimates imply that for each dollar of UI receipt wives earn up to 73 cents less. The reduction in spousal hours of work is over 40% as large as previous estimates of the effect of UI on search time of husbands.