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An Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion and Income Growth

Journal of Labor Economics 1996 14(4), 626-653
Risk aversion enters many theoretical models of human capital investment, but attitudes toward risk have not been incorporated in empirical models of human capital investment. This article develops a model of the joint investment in financial wealth and human wealth to show that human capital investment is an inverse function of the degree of relative risk aversion. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that wage growth is positively correlated with preferences for risk taking. More-educated individuals are also more likely to be risk takers, thus risk taking explains a portion of the returns to education.

The Quit Propensity of Married Men

Journal of Labor Economics 1987 5(4, Part 1), 533-560
This paper hypothesizes that the quit propensity of married men rises with an increase in their wives' income. Assuming that individuals are risk averse and that quitting is risky, the wife's income increases the husband's expected value of quitting by reducing the variance of expected family income. Using the longitudinal data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the wife's income is found to have a large effect on quits. The average husband's quit rate increases by about 45% when the wife's income rises from zero to two-thirds that of the husband's. The wife's income effect nearly offsets the negative effect that marriage typically has on male quit rates.

Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives

Journal of Labor Economics 2007 25(4), 613-650
Using unique panel data on production lines in U.S. minimills, we analyze the adoption of problem‐solving teams and group incentive pay and their effects on productivity. Almost every line ultimately adopts group incentives. However, problem‐solving teams are found almost exclusively in lines with more complex production processes. Consistent with these patterns, fixed‐effects models reveal increased productivity under group incentives in all lines, while teams raise productivity in lines with more complex production processes. This evidence indicates that teams give workers a valuable opportunity to solve problems in more complex production processes, while standard operating procedures appear to suffice elsewhere.

Serial Entrepreneurship: Learning by Doing?

Journal of Labor Economics 2016 34(S2), S217-S254
Among typical entrepreneurs, is serial entrepreneurship common? Is the serial entrepreneur more likely to succeed? If so, why? These questions are addressed using data on all establishments started between 1990 and 2011 to sell retail goods and services in Texas. An entrepreneur is the owner of a new business. A serial entrepreneur is one who opens repeat businesses. We find that 25.6% of businesses are operated by serial entrepreneurs. These are the more successful businesses: prior business experience increases the longevity of the next business opened. Results with owner fixed effects suggest that past experience imparts valuable business skills.

Making Do with Less: Working Harder during Recessions

Journal of Labor Economics 2016 34(S1), S333-S360 open access
There are two obvious possibilities that can account for the rise in productivity during recent recessions. The first is that the decline in the workforce was not random, and that the average worker was of higher quality during the recession than in the preceding period. The second is that each worker produced more while holding worker quality constant. We call the second effect, "making do with less," that is, getting more effort from fewer workers. Using data spanning June 2006 to May 2010 on individual worker productivity from a large firm, it is possible to measure the increase in productivity due to effort and sorting. For this firm, the second effect-that workers' effort increases-dominates the first effect-that the composition of the workforce differs over the business cycle.

Who Gets Hired? The Importance of Competition among Applicants

Journal of Labor Economics 2018 36(S1), S133-S181 open access
Being hired into a job depends not only on one’s own skill but also on that of other applicants. When another able applicant applies, a well-suited worker may be forced into unemployment or into accepting an inferior job. A model of this process defines over- and underqualification and provides predictions on its prevalence and on the wages of mismatched workers. It also implies that unemployment is concentrated among the least skilled workers, while vacancies are concentrated among high-skilled jobs. Four data sets are used to confirm the implications and establish that the hiring probability is low when competing applicants are able.

The Value of Bosses

Journal of Labor Economics 2015 33(4), 823-861
How and by how much do supervisors enhance worker productivity? Using a company-based data set on the productivity of technology-based services workers, we estimate supervisor effects and find them to be large. Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10% of boss quality with one who is in the upper 10% of boss quality increases a team’s total output by more than adding one worker to a nine-member team would. Workers assigned to better bosses are less likely to leave the firm. A separate normalization implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker.