This paper integrates the labor and assets markets equilibria to determine and evaluate the wage differentials generated for cyclical and noncyclical risks of unemployment. The relative wage differential is a linear function of unemployment risk measured by the covariance of an index of employment with the rate of change in aggregate output. Seniority and the hoarding of skilled labor are characteristics of minimum cost contracts because employees with more human capital prefer safer jobs. Empirical results suggest that a 14%-41% wage differential can be explained by interindustry differences in unemployment risks.

Children whose parents were self-employed before China’s socialist transformation were more likely to become self-employed after the economic reform, even though they had no direct exposure to their parents’ businesses. The effect is statistically significant only for sons. The lack of direct exposure to family businesses impedes the transfer of business human capital and motivates us to explore personality traits as the underlying mechanisms. We find that children with self-employed parents are also more likely to invest in risky assets and to consume cigarettes. This suggests that children of self-employed parents inherit personality traits that induce risky behaviors.

Understanding the employment dynamics of disadvantaged families is increasingly important. We estimate duration models describing these dynamics for disadvantaged single mothers and use them to conduct a rich set of counterfactual analyses. We use a misreporting model to correct for “seam bias,” the problem that too many transitions are reported between reference periods in panel data. We find effects of demographics, minimum wages, unemployment rates, and maximum welfare benefits, but not policy changes introduced through state welfare waivers, on employment dynamics. We find that two commonly used ad hoc methods of addressing seam bias perform substantially worse than our approach.

China shifted its controversial one-child policy (1979–2015) to a two-child policy in 2016. We take advantage of this unexpected policy change and the heterogeneities in the prechange environment to investigate labor market discrimination against expected family responsibilities. In a two-wave correspondence study before and after the policy change, we sent 8,848 fictitious resumes with ages 22–29 in response to online job advertisements. Their gender and only-child/siblinged status were systematically varied. We find that women—but not men—are subject to labor market discrimination for expected family responsibilities. This discrimination worsens with the increase in women’s reproductive age.

Firms’ organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to use promotion-based incentives. We develop a framework for identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences. We show that firms manage workers’ careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers’ careers.

We estimate whether students update the colleges to which they consider applying in response to large, unanticipated information shocks generated by the release of SAT scores—a primary factor in admission decisions. Exploiting population data on the timing of college selection and a policy that induces students to choose colleges prior to taking the exam, we find that students update their portfolios in terms of selectivity, tuition, and sector. However, the magnitude of updating is too modest to significantly reduce unexplained variation across students, suggesting that nonacademic factors are the dominant determinants of college match.

Spousal education is correlated with earnings for two reasons: cross‐productivity between couples and assortative mating. This article empirically disentangles the two effects by using Chinese twins data. We have two innovations: using twins data to control for the unobserved mating effect in our estimations and estimating both current and wedding‐time earnings equations. We find that both crossproductivity and mating are important in explaining the current earnings. Although the mating effect exists for both husbands and wives, the cross‐productivity effect mainly runs from Chinese husbands to wives. Our findings shed light on the theories of human capital, marriage, and the family.

We estimate the effect of endogenous training participation on transitions in and out of employment for disadvantaged women in the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) study. Decomposing the effect of training on employment into its effects on transitions in and out of employment has the potential to develop more effective programs. We also consider a potentially serious identification problem that arises when individuals do not undertake training immediately, and we propose a test to shed light on this problem. We find that this problem is not important in our context. JTPA classroom training substantially reduced unemployment durations, and thus it complements programs that increase employment durations.

This study investigates the effects of unobserved earnings-related endowments on marital outcomes, focusing on potential gender differences. Using a less stringent, more plausible assumption that monozygotic twins share more similar endowments relative to dizygotic twins, we develop a novel identification strategy from the twins experiment. Using unique Chinese twins survey data, we find that men with genetic endowments related to higher earnings marry earlier and have younger, taller wives; such women marry later and have older husbands with higher education and income. Results cast doubt on the conventional assumption of independence between unobservables and observable marital attributes.