A general equilibrium model of a dual economy is constructed with workers and managers and hierarchical production. Ability is continuous, and there is perfect competition in the product market. Higher quality of education is treated as a form of technical progress. An equilibrium wage profile is derived. Different kinds of technical and productivity changes yield different gainers and losers. Declines in the quality of education generally lead to an increase in inequality. Surprisingly, groups suffering from declines in quality of education often benefit at the cost of others. Parallels are drawn with recent experience.

We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of ability tracking in which schools decide how to allocate students into ability tracks and choose track-specific teacher effort; parents choose effort in response. The model is estimated using Early Childhood Longitudinal Study data. Our model suggests that a counterfactual ban on tracking would benefit low-ability students but hurt high-ability students. Ignoring effort adjustments would significantly overstate the impacts. We then illustrate the trade-offs involved when considering policies that affect schools’ tracking decisions. Setting proficiency standards to maximize average achievement would lead schools to redistribute their inputs from low- to high-ability students.