This article estimates worker switching costs and how much the employer switching of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. I use data on engineers across Swedish private sector firms to estimate the relative importance of employer wage policies and switching costs in a dynamic programming, discrete choice model of employer choice. The differentiated firms are modeled in employer characteristic space, and each firm has its own age‐wage profile. A majority of engineers have moderately high switching costs and a minority of experienced workers are responsive to outside wage offers. Younger workers are more sensitive to outside wage offers.

I present the fact that wage gaps due to firm size increase with job responsibility. I use Swedish data to determine whether wage gaps increase with a direct measure of job responsibility, to compare the age patterns of the wage gaps for blue‐ and white‐collar workers, and to compare wages by job responsibility and spans of control. With U.S. data, I compare supervisory to nonsupervisory occupations and find that wage gaps increase with job responsibility for most occupational ladders. This fact is consistent with hierarchical matching models in which the larger number of subordinates amplifies managerial talent.

Estimates of the intertemporal labor supply behavior of males in Canada using micro data are reported. Individuals make the intertemporal labor supply decision on the basis of annual hours and weeks. Precision of the parameter estimates is improved by using tenure variables as instruments for the wage. Further, the age and tenure variables are allowed to have taste parameters in the structural equations. The evidence suggests that this is required only for the two age variables. Elasticity evidence suggests that evolutionary changes in the wage cause changes in the number of weeks with the elasticity being 0.6 and statistically significant.

A general stochastic model of optimal job separation behavior is developed in the paper. The model nests both the job training and the job-matching hypotheses of the wage-tenure relationship as special cases. The purpose of the paper is to compare the implications of the two hypotheses for job turnover. That expected wealth-maximizing separation strategies are qualitatively identical under the two hypotheses is the principal theoretical result. Although the empirical implications of the two hypotheses for observations on the distribution of completed job-spell lengths are similar as a consequence, they are not quite identical.

This paper discusses three independent inquiries into consequences of the rise in women's labor force participation rate (LFPR) in the United States since 1946. (1) The growth in women's LFPR is decomposed by decade, age, marital status, presence of age-specific children, and years of schooling. (2) Evidence on the impact of the growth on the inequality in income among husband-wife families is summarized and the impact on income inequality in other family structures is discussed. The effect on the level of family real income is considered and "money illusion" in measuring the change in income is noted. (3) Bivariate autoregressive time series are estimated with annual data from 1950 to 1980, indicating that lagged values of women's LFPR are systematically correlated with measures of flow fertility, marriage, schooling, and men's income, while only fertility has a strong, persistent lagged correlation with LFPR.

This article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance. Production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity; positive effects, where they exist, appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process. Lower profitability among unionized firms is well established; more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long-lived tangible and intangible capital. The connection between unions, investment behavior, and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry, although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism's long-run impact.

A large literature attempts to explain compensation and personnel policies in large organizations. Three features of the U.S. military system—flat rank spreads in pay, a relatively generous pension, and heavy reliance on up‐or‐out promotions—are at variance with common practices in large civilian organizations. This article develops a model of individual decision making in a large, hierarchical organization and uses the model to explain these apparent puzzles. The lack of lateral entry and heterogeneity in entrants’ abilities and preferences for military service play key roles in the observed policies.

Firms often view job applicant referrals from current employees as more informative than direct applications or referrals through formal labor market intermediaries such as placement firms. The authors argue that old boy networks reduce employers' uncertainty about worker productivity. Using Jovanovic's job matching model, they show that workers hired through the old boy network should (1) earn higher initial salaries, (2) experience lower subsequent wage growth on the job, and (3) stay on the job longer than otherwise comparable workers hired from outside the network. They find considerable support for this theory using data from the 1972 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers.

The 1970 and 1979 Current Population Surveys are used to compute the personal distribution of income. The major innovation in this paper is that all individuals in the household are not treated identically. In particular, children receive a different proportion of income than do adults. That proportion is estimated. Its variations with respect to household characteristics are discussed, and a final distribution of personal income is computed. That distribution has considerably fatter tails than does the one normally used.

Theoretical economic models, official labor force statistics, and most empirical studies of young workers disregard employment experience of students under age 16. Evidence from several sources, however, suggests that students ages 14 and 15 acquire substantial employment experience. Moreover, that experience is vastly different for black and white youths. Several policy-related issues, including causes of black-white differences in adult earnings, may deserve to be interpreted differently in the light of differentials in early employment experience. This employment experience of 14- and 15-year-olds in general and its racial pattern in particular should not continue to be ignored.