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Manufacturing plants have a clear life cycle: they are born small, grow substantially with age, and eventually die. Economists have long thought that this life cycle is driven by organization capital, the accumulation of plant‐specific knowledge. The location of plants in the life cycle determines the size of the payments, or organization rents, plant owners receive from organization capital. These payments are compensation for the interest cost to plant owners of waiting for their plants to grow. We use a quantitative growth model of the life cycle of plants, along with U.S. data, to infer the overall size of these payments.

During the Great Recession, US regions that experienced large declines in household debt also experienced large drops in consumption, employment, and wages. We develop a search and matching model in which tighter debt constraints raise the cost of investing in new job vacancies and so reduce job-finding rates and employment. On-the-job human capital accumulation is critical to generating sizable drops in employment: it increases the duration of the benefit flows from posting vacancies, thereby amplifying the employment drop from a credit tightening 10-fold relative to the standard model. Our model reproduces the salient cross-regional features of the US Great Recession.

The authors ask whether a two-country business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles. With this question in mind, the authors document a number of discrepancies between theory and data. The most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries. In this data, outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions. In the model they see the opposite.

Recent empirical work on financial crises documents that crises tend to occur when macroeconomic fundamentals are weak; but even after conditioning on an exhaustive list of fundamentals, a sizable random component to crises and associated capital flows remains. We develop a model of herd behavior consistent with these observations. Informational frictions together with standard debt default problems lead to volatile capital flows resembling hot money and financial crises. We show that repaying debt during difficult times identifies a government as financially resilient, enhances its reputation, and stabilizes capital flows. Bailing out governments deprives resilient countries of the opportunity to differentiate themselves from the nonresilient.

The authors propose a definition of time-consistent policy for infinite-horizon economies with competitive private agents. Allocations and policies are defined as functions of the history of past policies. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that satisfy certain sequential optimality conditions for the government and for private agents. The authors provide a complete characterization of the sustainable equilibrium outcomes for a variant of Stanley Fischer's model of capital taxation. They also relate their work to recent developments in the theory of repeated games.

The US Great Recession featured a large decline in output and labor, tighter financial conditions, and a large increase in firm growth dispersion. We build a model in which increased volatility at the firm level generates a downturn and worsened credit conditions. The key idea is that hiring inputs is risky because financial frictions limit firms’ ability to insure against shocks. An increase in volatility induces firms to reduce their inputs to reduce such risk. Our model can generate most of the decline in output and labor in the Great Recession and the observed increase in firms’ interest rate spreads.

When is financial repression—namely, policies that force banks to hold government debt—optimal? With commitment, such policies are never optimal because they crowd out banks’ productive investments. Without commitment, they are optimal when governments need to issue unusually large amounts of debt, such as during wartime. In such times, repression allows governments to credibly issue more debt. Repression increases credibility because when banks hold government debt, defaults dilute net worth, reduce investment, and are thus costly ex post. Forcing banks to hold debt endogenously increases these ex post costs but has ex ante costs because doing so crowds out investments.