Knowledge that Transforms

Productive factors such as human and phyaical capital are accumulated and trade can affect the steady-state levels of such factors. Consequently, trade liberalization will have dynamic effects on output and welfare as the economy moves to its new steady state, in addition to its usual static effects. The output impact of this dynamic effect is measurable and appears to be quite large. The welfare impact of this dynamic effect is also measurable. The size of this dynamic gain from trade depends on the importance of external scale economies.

The authors describe a model in which rental and owner housing are risky assets, tenure choice is endogenous, and each household is constrained to consume the same amount of owner housing that it has in its investment portfolio. Equilibrium net rates of return are major determinants of the amount of owner housing, but a logit model indicates that demographic factors are the main determinants of ownership rates. In their simulation, taxes on owner housing would raise welfare not only by reallocating capital but also by the government's taking part of the risk from individual properties and diversifying it away.

Recent models of firm investment decisions stressing informational imperfections in capital markets provide a foundation for interpreting evidence that movements in internal finance can predict investment spending, even after one controls for measures of firms' investment opportunities. While such evidence is suggestive, it is often open to other interpretations. We examine these models using data on equipment investment in the U.S. agricultural sector. This sector is particularly interesting because it has experienced large fluctuations in net worth and the profitability of investment, and reasonable measures of net worth can be constructed. Our findings provide support for a class of "internal funds" models of investment under asymmetric information.

This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. The authors show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. The authors find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.

An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.

A key economic issue is whether poor countries or regions tend to grow faster than rich ones: are there automatic forces that lead to convergence over time in the levels of per capita income and product? We use the neoclassical growth model as a framework to study convergence across the 48 contiguous U.S. states. We exploit data on personal income since 1840 and on gross state product since 1963. The U.S. states provide clear evidence of convergence, but the findings can be reconciled quantitatively with the neoclassical model only if diminishing returns to capital set in very slowly. The results for per capita gross domestic product from a broad sample of countries are similar if we hold constant a set of variables that proxy for differences in steady-state characteristics.