Knowledge that Transforms

Previous articleNext article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as Percentage of Decisions within Decision Type)Desk Rejection57%1170%Reject with Reviews35%1349621%1st Round R&R9%21217547%View Table Image Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 126, Number 6December 2018 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/701585 © 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesFull TextPDF Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Daron AcemogluJerome AddaSumit AgarwalAnna AizerS. Nageeb AliDouglas AlmondRicardo AlonsoAttila AmbrusGene AmrominMichael L. AndersonCostas ArkolakisEnghin AtalayAndrew AtkesonOrazio AttanasioAlan AuerbachDavid Austen-SmithEduardo AzevedoSandeep BaligaNicholas BarberisPanle BarwickJonathan BeauchampPeter BellwoodDaniel BenjaminPietro BiroliDaniel BjorkegrenDorthe BlesesAndrea BonfattiJohn BoundSamuel BowlesBen BrooksLorenzo CasaburiHector ChadeKarim ChalakSylvain ChassangRaj ChettyDamon ClarkKerem CosarGordon DahlJulio DavilaLucas DavisJan De LoeckerMariacristina De NardiWill DobbieCarlos DobkinUlrich DoraszelskiJohn DriscollOeindrila DubeSteven DurlaufChristian DustmannJesse EdgertonMark EganLars EhlersMichal FabingerErnst FehrRaymond FismanChristopher FlinnNicole FortinEyal FrankCarola FrydmanTitus GalamaDaniel GarrettPieter GautierMatthew GentzkowClaudia GoldinMikhail GolosovAustan GoolsbeeOlivier GossnerAdam GurenMarcus HagedornRobert HallDaniel HamermeshJoseph HarringtonJohn HatfieldTarjei HavnesBenjamin HebertOri HeffetzThomas HolmesRichard HornbeckSteffen HuckPatrick HummelMitsuru IgamiKoichiro ItoGregor JaroschRuixue JiaKoen JochmansLouis KaplowJakub KastlRyan KelloggWilliam KerrPatrick KlineFrederic KoesslerAnton KolotilinScott KominersDirk KruegerPer KrusellMarianna KudlyakJeanne LafortuneFabian LangeJohn LazarevJacob LeshnoIlse LindenlaubElliot LipnowskiMolly LipscombAlessandro LizzeriLee LockwoodKatrine LokenLambert LumeyDavid MalisonIoana MarinescuLaurent MathevetRosa MatzkinIgnacia MercadalKarel MertensGuy MichaelsBenny MoldovanuEduardo MoralesMassimo MorelliJack MountjoyKathleen MullenEmi NakamuraJ. NearyDavid NeumarkPaul NiehausPascal NoelNathan NunnEzra OberfieldDmitry OrlovGerard Padro i MiquelMarianne PageAmanda PallaisRonni PavanJohn PepperFranco PeracchiKenneth PomeranzValerie RameyGautam RaoImran RasulStephen ReddingPatrick ReyJessica ReyesDavid RibarMark RosenzweigMartin RotembergAlvin RothNicholas RyanViplav SainiRaul Sanchez de la SierraCezar SantosWolfram SchlenkerStephan SeilerKathryn ShawHolger SiegCarolyn SloaneLones SmithTayfun SonmezDavid SplinterRobert StaigerChristopher StantonJohannes StroebelJuan Carlos Suarez SerratoTakuo SugayaAndrew SweetingIna TanevaPietro TebaldiPetra ToddAlexander TorgovitskyJose Tudon MaldonadoMatthew TurnerJay Van BavelEric Van WincoopSofia Villas-BoasMaria WaldingerChristopher WaltersDavid WeilMichael WhinstonAlexander WolitzkyArlene WongDaniel Yi XuDanny YaganH. YoungNoam YuchtmanArianna ZanoliniAndy ZapechelnyukAlexander ZentefisEkaterina ZhuravskayaJames ZiliakJonathan Zinman Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 126, Number 4August 2018 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/699946 Views: 89 © 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Jerome AddaIngela AlgerDouglas AlmondRicardo AlonsoJose ApesteguiaPeter ArcidiaconoCostas ArkolakisEnghin AtalayDavid AtkinEric AuerbachGhazala AzmatPierre AzoulayDaniel BarronJere BehrmanDaniel BenjaminMartin BerajaDavid BergerTheodore BergstromSonia BhalotraVivek BhattacharyaSushil BikhchandaniL. Kamran BilirFrederic BoissayStephane BonhommeGharad BryanLuis CabralDavide CantoniAndrew CaplinChristopher ChambersSylvain ChassangYeon-Koo CheJudith ChevalierJohn CochraneJ. Anthony CooksonThomas CovertBrendan DaleyAnna Piil DammMorris DavisAnthony DeFuscoManasi DeshpandeWouter DesseinUlrich DoraszelskiDavid DornChristian DustmannPiotr DworczakDennis EppleSeda ErtacIgnacio EspondaBenjamin FaberJames FeigenbaumDean FosterThierry FoucaultAnthony FowlerAlexander FrankelEric FrenchWilla FriedmanAlfred GalichonJorge GarciaJoshua GottliebGautam GowrisankaranPaul GriecoPauline GrosjeanShoshana GrossbardLuca GuerrieriYingni GuoGeoffrey HealDavidson HeathMark HoekstraThomas HolmesRichard HornbeckJean-Francois HoudePeter HullMatthew JacksonPhilippe JehielBenjamin JonesBoyan JovanovicEthan KaplanAdam KaporLoukas KarabarbounisHiroyuki KasaharaMaximilian KasySupreet KaurTim KautzTodd KeisterRyan KelloggWilliam KerrBrendan KlinePatrick KlineRalph KoijenRobert KollmannMatthew KotchenAlan KrauseMichael KremerKory KroftTheresa KuchlerThibaut LamadonTim LandvoigtFabian LangeSoren Leth-PetersenEdwin LeuvenDavid LevineArik LevinsonDanielle LiNuno LimaoJesper LindeIlse LindenlaubMatti LiskiLance LochnerMichael LovenheimCorinne LowHanno LustigNeale MahoneyMihai ManeaElena ManresaIan MartinFilip MatejkaLaurent MathevetNiko MatouschekDavid MatsaFabrizio MattesiniMaurizio MazzoccoJuanjuan MengAlbert MenkveldKarel MertensJorgen ModalsliCyril MonnetSara MoreiraMelanie MortenPetra MoserAndreas MoxnesAndreas MuellerMakoto NakajimaRamana NandaIshan NathDavid NeumarkEzra OberfieldMarcelo OlarreagaPaulina OlivaEmily OwensMichaela PagelAlbert ParkMarkus PelgerPaolo PinottiBenjamin PugsleyNancy QianJohn QuahValerie RameyNatalia RamondoJoao RamosDevesh RavalCollin RaymondJames RobinsonAnne-Katrin RoeslerWilliam RogersonMark RosenzweigEsteban Rossi-HansbergMaya Rossin-SlaterLeena RudankoKim RuhlJohn RustAldo RustichiniMaryam SaeediJozsef SakovicsTobias SalzBhaven SampatAlvaro SandroniSimon ScheideggerMartin SchmalzMartin SchneiderRicardo Serrano-PadialJoseph ShapiroDavid SilverCarolyn SloaneErik SnowbergIsaac SorkinAmir SufiChristopher TonettiMaxim TroshkinAleh TsyvinskiJose TudonBertil TungoddenMartin UribeJohannes Van BiesebroeckStijn Van NieuwerburghVikrant VigMark VotrubaNaoki WakamoriReed WalkerMatthew WeinzierlYoram WeissArlene WongDaniel Yi XuChen XueKaren YeYves ZenouOwen ZidarUlf ZoelitzEric Zwick Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 126, Number 6December 2018 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/701647 © 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the outset coincides with the equilibrium without commitment. When the condition fails, as in the case of time-inconsistent preferences, commitment can improve outcomes. We discuss several applications.

We build a tractable growth model in which multiproduct incumbents invest in internal innovations to improve their existing products, while new entrants and incumbents invest in external innovations to acquire new product lines. External and internal innovations generate heterogeneous innovation qualities, and firm size affects innovation incentives. We analyze how different types of innovation contribute to economic growth and the role of the firm size distribution. Our model aligns with many observed empirical regularities, and we quantify our framework with Census Bureau and patent data for US firms. Internal innovation scales moderately faster with firm size than external innovation.

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

The arrival of global retail chains in developing countries is causing a radical transformation in the way that households source their consumption. This paper draws on a new collection of Mexican microdata to estimate the effect of foreign supermarket entry on household welfare. The richness of the microdata allows us to estimate a general expression for the gains from retail FDI, and to decompose these gains into several distinct channels. We find that foreign retail entry causes large and significant welfare gains for the average household that are mainly driven by a reduction in the cost of living. About one quarter of this price index effect is due to pro-competitive effects on the prices charged by domestic stores, with the remaining three quarters due to the direct consumer gains from shopping at the new foreign stores. In contrast, we find little evidence of significant changes in average municipality-level incomes or employment. We do, however, find evidence of store exit, adverse effects on domestic store profits and reductions in the incomes of traditional retail sector workers. We also show that the gains from retail FDI are on average positive for all income groups but regressive, and quantify the opposing forces that underlie this finding. Finally, we find that the estimated gains are specific to foreign entry, rather than being driven by the entry of modern store formats more generally.

We study the link between market forces, cross-sectional inequality, and intergenerational mobility. Emphasizing complementarities in the production of human capital, we show that wealthy parents invest, on average, more in their offspring than poorer ones. As a result, economic status persists across generations even in a world with perfect capital markets and without differences in innate ability. In fact, under certain conditions, successive generations of the same family may cease to regress toward the mean. We also consider how short- and long-run mobility are affected by changes in the returns to human capital.

This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil’s anticorruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Our results suggest that the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived nonelectoral costs of engaging in corruption.

This paper models decisions to apply to and attend charter schools in Boston using a generalized Roy selection framework linking preferences to the achievement gains generated by charter attendance. The model is estimated with instruments based on randomized admission lotteries and distance to charter schools. Charter schools generate larger gains for disadvantaged students, but demand for charters is stronger among more advantaged students. Similarly, gains are inversely related to unobserved preferences for charters. As a result, counterfactual simulations indicate that charter expansion is likely to be most effective when accompanied by efforts to target students who are unlikely to apply.