Knowledge that Transforms

Previous article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection50%970%Reject with Reviews42%1239416%Revise9%18415138%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 457 daysView Table Image Previous article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 5October 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705908 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Richard AkreshS. Nageeb AliFranklin AllenSiwan AndersonIsaiah AndrewsJose ApesteguiaAndrew AtkesonHeski Bar-IsaacPhilip BarrettBrian BeachJonathan BeauchampDaniel BenjaminRaquel BernalDan BernhardtV BhaskarAnna BindlerAndreas BlumeAlessandro BonattiOzan CandoganTimothy CasonDavid CesariniChristopher ChambersDamon ClarkAlain CohnJanet CurrieXianchi DaiErnesto Dal BoRafael Di TellaWill DobbieUlrich DoraszelskiMartin DufwenbergKeith EricsonSelman ErolJason FabermanJames FearonRaymond FismanChristopher FlinnAnthony FowlerXavier GabaixSebastian GalianiYana GallenPeter GanongRonald GoettlerRussell GolmanBenjamin GolubGautam GowrisankaranJeff GroggerGene GrossmanLars HansenTerrence HendershottHolger HerzRandi HjalmarssonMitchell HoffmanRichard HoldenRichard HornbeckPatrick HummelMitsuru IgamiLakshmi IyerPamela JakielaSeema JayachandranRobert JensenIan JewittLouis KaplowMichael KatzRalph KoijenFuhito KojimaAnton KolotilinSerhiy KozakAlbert KyleJoanna LaheyRasmus LandersoeFabian LangeAudrey LaporteBrad LarsenJohn LeahySangMok LeeLars LefgrenArik LevinsonShengwu LiAnnie LiangIlse LindenlaubMatthew LindquistBenjamin LockwoodLee LockwoodAlexander MackayJames MalcomsonMarco MariottiPaco MartorellGiovanni MastrobuoniR. McAfeeRyan McDevittXin MengRobert MoffittBenny MoldovanuFrancesca MolinariJack MountjoySharun MukandRichard MurphyDavid NeumarkPaul NiehausSam NorrisEmily OsterMichaela PagelAmanda PallaisLubos PastorAlessandro PavanJacopo PeregoRicardo Perez-TrugliaPetra PerssonRobert PollakJoseph PriceNancy QianNatalia RamondoChris RobinsonJames RobinsonGuillaume RocheteauAnne-Katrin RoeslerWilliam RogersonAdam RosenNilanjan RoyAldo RustichiniMartin SaavedraJohn SabelhausBernard SalanieTobias SalzAndres SantosAndrew SchotterEmanuela SciubbaEdson SeverniniDaniel SilvermanOskar SkansIsaac SorkinCharles SprengerYves SprumontBruno StruloviciMatthias SutterAlexander TabarrokMathieu Taschereau-DumouchelAlan TaylorMelissa ThomassonChristopher TimminsMirco ToninEric Van WincoopJoseph VavraEmanuel VespaSofia Villas-BoasReed WalkerTodd WalkerChristopher WallaceEbonya WashingtonDavid WettsteinDavid WheelockHeidi WilliamsEdward WolffThomas WollmannLeeat YarivNoam YuchtmanJohn Yiran ZhuOwen ZidarJames Ziliak Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 4August 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705558 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Previous articleNext article FreeRecent RefereesPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Ran AbramitzkyEliot AbramsDaron AcemogluPhilipp AgerMohammad AkbarpourDouglas AlmondIsaiah AndrewsCharles AngelucciEduardo AzevedoScott BakerMiguel BallesterSamuel BazziJere BehrmanManudeep BhullerBruno BiaisDan BlackAlessandro BonattiMichael BordoEthan Bueno de MesquitaAriel BursteinLeonardo BursztynMarika CabralSteven CallanderJuan CarrilloKatherine CaseyAllan Collard-WexlerJonathan ColmerThomas CovertBenjamin CrostGordon DahlAndrew DaughetyGustavo De SouzaMelissa DellRebecca DiamondMichael DicksteinWill DobbieUlrich DoraszelskiChristian DustmannPiotr DworczakBenjamin EdelmanLasse EikaIgnacio EspondaJianqing FanHanming FangMax FarrellShuaizhang FengJesus Fernandez-VillaverdeJoseph FerrieFrederico FinanChristopher FlinnMarco FrancesconiPatrick FrancoisChao FuXavier GabaixPatrick GagliardiniCraig GalletOded GalorJorge Luis GarciaCamilo Garcia-JimenoMatthew GentzkowAlexander GorbenkoPiero GottardiJoshua GottliebFrancois GourioJeff GroggerRaymond GuiterasMarcus HagedornWilliam HanlonChiaki HaraTarjei HavnesKen HendricksRandi HjalmarssonRichard HoldenRichard HornbeckPeter HullSonia JaffePhilippe JehielGinger JinAmir JinaMatthew KahnRohan KekreRyan KelloggWilliam KerrBen KeysMartin KliemPatrick KlineScott KominersYunmi KongWojciech KopczukIgor KopylovBotond KoszegiTom KrebsKory KroftFelix KublerPeter KuhnKevin LangFabian LangeKurt LavettiJacob LeshnoMartin LettauEdwin LeuvenAndrei LevchenkoShengwu LiTong LiMing-Jen LinMaarten LindeboomJohn ListAlessandro LizzeriKatrine LokenGuido LorenzoniJune MaJim MacGeeNeale MahoneyMihai ManeaAlan ManningGustavo MansoRamon MarimonGiovanni MastrobuoniNiko MatouschekKathleen McGarryAlisdair McKayBrian McManusJonathan MeerLeonardo MelosiKyle MengMoritz Meyer-ter-VehnGuy MichaelsEdward MiguelKurt MitmanMassimo MorelliThayer MorrillMichael Mueller-SmithCaitlin MyersBarry NalebuffDerek NealPeter NormanMichael OstrovskyThomas PalfreyAmanda PallaisRohini PandeFernando ParroMichael PetersHerakles PolemarchakisBruce PrestonGautam RaoDaniel RappoportJohn RehbeckLudovic RenouHelene ReySteven RivkinJames RobertsJean-Laurent RosenthalMark RosenzweigHeather RoyerAysegul SahinBernard SalanieAnalia SchlosserMoritz SchularickKarl SchurterJoseph ShapiroBradley ShapiroHolger SiegArunima SinhaLones SmithAnthony Smith, Jr.Erik SnowbergPaulo SomainiJorge SpenkuchCharles SprengerLudwig StraubJohannes StroebelJan StuhlerTakuo SugayaPaolo SuricoJustin SydnorBalazs SzentesPietro TebaldiFelix TintelnotJean TirolePetra ToddAlexander TorgovitskyAaron TornellRagnar TorvikUtku UnverMartin UribeArthur van SoestAdrien VerdelhanPietro VeronesiJonathan VogelNico VoigtlaenderFabian WaldingerReed WalkerThomas WinberryAlexander WolitzkyLeeat YarivJunjian YiAli YurukogluBasit Zafar Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 5October 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/706773 © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends Rubinstein’s alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms’ marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair’s Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.

Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differences within industries and their role in resource allocation. This paper examines the allocational efficiency of such markets. Productivity differences introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency: selection of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across firms. We show that these considerations affect welfare and policy analysis, and market power across firms leads to distortions in resource allocation. Demand-side elasticities determine how resources are misallocated and when increased competition from market expansion provides welfare gains.

We study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such as higher or lower levels of Intelligence, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness, but who are very similar otherwise. Intelligence has a large and positive long-run effect on cooperative behavior. The effect is strong when at the equilibrium of the repeated game there is a trade-off between short-run gains and long-run losses. Conscientiousness and Agreeableness have a natural, significant but transitory effect on cooperation rates.

Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.

We nonparametrically estimate spillovers of properties financed by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) onto neighborhood residents by developing a new difference-in-differences style estimator. LIHTC development revitalizes low-income neighborhoods, increasing house prices 6.5%, lowering crime rates, and attracting racially and income diverse populations. LIHTC development in higher income areas causes house price declines of 2.5% and attracts lower income households. Linking these price effects to a hedonic model of preferences, LIHTC developments in low-income areas cause aggregate welfare benefits of $116 million. Affordable housing development acts like a place-based policy and can revitalize low-income communities.

We provide a framework for empirical analysis of negotiated-price markets. Using mortgage market data and a search and negotiation model, we characterize the welfare impact of search frictions and quantify the role of search costs and brand loyalty for market power. Search frictions reduce consumer surplus by $12/month/consumer, 28 percent of which can be associated with discrimination, 22 percent with inefficient matching, and 50 percent with search costs. Banks with large consumer bases have margins 70 percent higher than those with small consumer bases. The main source of this incumbency advantage is brand loyalty; however, price discrimination based on search frictions accounts for almost a third.

We investigate the determinants of students’ university choice in Pakistan, with a focus on monetary returns, nonpecuniary factors enjoyed at school, and financial constraints. To mitigate the identification problem concerning the separation of preferences, expectations, and market constraints, we use rich data on subjective expectations, with direct measures of financial constraints, to estimate a life-cycle model of school choice jointly with school-specific expectations of dropping out. We find that labor market prospects play a small role. Instead, nonpecuniary outcomes, such as the school’s ideology, are the major determinants. Policy simulations suggest that relaxing financial constraints would have large welfare gains.