This paper explores a model where private charity and public transfers are determined simultaneously. In political equilibrium, the government "overprovides" public transfers, transferring more to the poor than altruistic taxpayers prefer. At this equilibrium, private charity is zero. Evidence for this result is found by examining various types of data from the 1920s to the present. While private charity currently exceeds $50 billion, very little of it goes to the poor. I provide evidence that this phenomenon of zero private charity began, as the model predicts, in the 1930s, the beginning of federal intervention in the charity market.

This paper explores a model where private charity and public transfers are determined simultaneously. In political equilibrium, the government "overprovides" public transfers, transferring more to the poor than altruistic taxpayers prefer. At this equilibrium, private charity is zero. Evidence for this result is found by examining various types of data from the 1920s to the present. While private charity currently exceeds $50 billion, very little of it goes to the poor. I provide evidence that this phenomenon of zero private charity began, as the model predicts, in the 1930s, the beginning of federal intervention in the charity market.

A long tradition in the development literature has been to associate the aggregate savings rate with the dependency ratio, the ratio of dependent children to adults. In this paper I formalize the relationship by developing a life-cycle model in which offspring are assets from the viewpoint of their parents. The model is used to help explain the increase in nineteenth-century U.S. savings rates. I find that between 1830 and 1900 about one-quarter of the 6-percentage-point rise in the savings rate can be attributed to a decline in the dependency rate.

All but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have been preceded, typically with a lag of around three-fourths of a year, by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum. This does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions. Evidence is presented, however, that even over the period 1948-72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious, supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the U.S. recessions prior to 1972. By extension, energy price increases may account for much of post-OPEC macroeconomic performance.

A long tradition in the development literature has been to associate the aggregate savings rate with the dependency ratio, the ratio of dependent children to adults. In this paper I formalize the relationship by developing a life-cycle model in which offspring are assets from the viewpoint of their parents. The model is used to help explain the increase in nineteenth-century U.S. savings rates. I find that between 1830 and 1900 about one-quarter of the 6-percentage-point rise in the savings rate can be attributed to a decline in the dependency rate.

There are two possible outcomes of transport regulation: (1) maintaining a carrier cartel and (2) imposing equalizing discrimination against advantaged and in favor of disadvantaged shippers. Both functions have required a complex rate structure to enforce the respective forms of price discrimination. Using a sample of freight bills from motor carriers and railroads, this paper demonstrates that the principal result of motor carrier regulation has been to maintain a cartel of truckers, while railroad regulation has thwarted the wishes of the railroad cartel by imposing equalizing discrimination on weak and strong shippers. Motor carrier rates respond in an economically rational manner to costs and shipper bargaining power; rail rates are either unresponsive or perversely responsive to the same factors. Deregulation should have divergent effects in the two industries.

This paper presents an answer, not found in the literature, to Rothschild's criticism that search models are unsatisfactory until they provide an explanation of price dispersion. The search models of Stiler and McCall are closed by explaining the firm's optimal decision-making problem. Then the existence of an equilibrium distribution of prices is established for both models. The analysis shows that price dispersion is supported and explained by a dispersion of production costs. The Stigler model shows that the variance of the price distribution increases while the McCall model shows that the variance eventually decreases with the intensity of search.