Knowledge that Transforms

The neoclassical growth model is used to identify the short‐run effects of neutral technology shocks, which affect the production of all goods homogeneously, and investment‐specific shocks, which affect only investment goods. The real equipment price, crucial for identifying the investment shocks, experiences an abrupt increase in its average rate of decline in 1982, so the analysis is based on a split sample. On the basis of the preferred specification, the two technology shocks account for 73 percent of hours’ and 44 percent of output’s business cycle variation before 1982, and 38 percent and 80 percent afterward. The shocks also account for more than 40 percent of hours’ and 58 percent of output’s forecast errors over a three‐ to eight‐year horizon in both samples. The majority of these effects are driven by the investment shocks.

We estimate auto accident externalities (more specifically insurance externalities) using panel data on state‐average insurance premiums and loss costs. Externalities appear to be substantial in traffic‐dense states: in California, for example, we find that the increase in traffic density from a typical additional driver increases total statewide insurance costs of other drivers by 1,725–3,239 per year, depending on the model. High–traffic density states have large economically and statistically significant externalities in all specifications we check. In contrast, the accident externality per driver in low‐traffic states appears quite small. On balance, accident externalities are so large that a correcting Pigouvian tax could raise $66 billion annually in California alone, more than all existing California state taxes during our study period, and over $220 billion per year nationally.

We study indirect democracy in which countries, states, or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf. We show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district’s vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change. We analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents’ preferences, and then we compare the voting weights in the Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed Constitution.

This paper estimates the effect of privatization on multifactor productivity using comprehensive panel data on initially state‐owned manufacturing firms in four economies. We exploit the data’s longitudinal dimension to control for preprivatization selection and estimate long‐run impacts. The estimates are robust to functional form but sensitive to selection controls. Our preferred random growth estimates imply positive multifactor productivity effects of 15 percent in Romania, 8 percent in Hungary, and 2 percent in Ukraine, but a −3 percent effect in Russia. The foreign privatization effect is larger (18–35 percent) in all countries. Positive domestic effects appear immediately in Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine and continue growing thereafter, but emerge only five years after privatization in Russia.

This study examines educational and labor outcomes of children affected by a ban on abortions. I use evidence from Romania, where in 1966 dictator Nicolae Ceauescu declared abortion and family planning illegal. Birth rates doubled in 1967 because formerly abortion had been the primary method of birth control. Children born after the abortion ban attained more years of schooling and greater labor market success. The reason is that urban, educated women were more likely to have abortions prior to the policy change, and the relative number of children born to this type of woman increased after the ban. However, when I control for composition using observable background variables, children born after the ban on abortions had worse educational and labor market achievements as adults.

This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated across innovators who arrive at various times. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovators. The resulting mechanism resembles a menu of patents that have infinite duration and fixed scope. This optimal patent menu can be implemented with a simple buyout scheme: The innovator commits at the outset to a price ceiling at which he will sell his rights to a future inventor. When a larger fee is paid initially, a higher price ceiling is obtained. Any subsequent innovator must pay this price and purchase his own buyout fee contract. We relate this mechanism to the proposed compulsory licensing schemes.

Behavioral economics has demonstrated systematic decision‐making biases in both lab and field data. Do these biases extend across contexts, cultures, or even species? We investigate this question by introducing fiat currency and trade to a colony of capuchin monkeys and recovering their preferences over a range of goods and gambles. We show that capuchins react rationally to both price and wealth shocks but display several hallmark biases when faced with gambles, including reference dependence and loss aversion. Given our capuchins’ inexperience with money and trade, these results suggest that loss aversion extends beyond humans and may be innate rather than learned.

Fifty years ago this Journal published Simon Rottenberg’s “The Baseball Players’ Labor Market,” the first professional journal article in sports economics. In this retrospective we review some of his insights and analyses with regard to competitive balance, constraints on payroll and freedoms to contract, revenue sharing, territorial rights, and the supply of talent. We also note subsequent industry developments Rottenberg could not have anticipated and identify where he was ahead of his time.

This paper examines a single, narrow decision—the choice on fourth down in the National Football League between kicking and trying for a first down—as a case study of the standard view that competition in the goods, capital, and labor markets leads firms to make maximizing choices. Play‐by‐play data and dynamic programming are used to estimate the average payoffs to kicking and trying for a first down under different circumstances. Examination of actual decisions shows systematic, clear‐cut, and overwhelmingly statistically significant departures from the decisions that would maximize teams’ chances of winning. Possible reasons for the departures are considered.

This paper develops a general model of private provision of a public good that includes the option to consume an impure public good. The model is used to investigate the positive and normative consequences of "green markets," which are based on technologies with joint production of a private good and an environmental public good. It is shown that under reasonable conditions green markets can have beneficial or detrimental effects on environmental quality and social welfare. The analysis applies equally to nonenvironmental choice settings, with examples ranging from socially responsible investments to commercial activities associated with charitable fund-raising.