A firm’s actions in one market can change competitors’ strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other mar-ket. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors’ products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more “aggressive” play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises compet-ing firms’ marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.

Many issues in macroeconomics, such as the level of the steady state interest rate, or the dynamic effects of government deficit finance, depend crucially on the horizon of economic agents. This paper develops a simple analytical model in which such issues can be examined and in which the horizon of agents is a parameter which can be chosen arbitrarily.The first three sections of the paper characterize the dynamics and steady state of the economy in the absence of a government. The focus is on the effects of the horizon index on the economy. The paper clarifies in particular the separate roles of finite horizons and declining labor income through life in the determination of steady state interest rates.The next three sections study the effects and the role of fiscal policy.The focus is on the effects of deficit finance both in closed and open economies. The paper clarifies the respective roles of government spending, deficits and debt in the determination of interest rates

It is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes. This hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue's server. The Nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are de- rived. It is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed. The model does not have strin- gent informational requirements, and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue. It also suggests a useful auctioning procedure.

This paper reexamines the issues of compliance with and enforcement of the minimum wage law recently addressed in this Journal by Ashenfelter and Smith and by Grenier. Pursuing a more rigorous methodology we are able to add new general conclusions, and correct and reconcile some previous conflicting conclusions concerning the role of the disparity between the minimum and free market wages, the level and elasticity of labor demand, and the magnitude of deterring monetary sanctions on the noncompliance decision. Our formulation also addresses the law evasion (reduced wages) as well as the law avoidance (modified employment) aspects of the noncompliance decision, which previous formulations have ignored