The World Bank and others maintain that the major mechanism for improving nutrition in poor communities is increases in income. Aggregate estimates of food expenditure are consistent with such a possibility, implying income/expenditure elasticities close to one. However, the high degree of aggregation at which such estimates are made means that the considerable increase in price per nutrient as income increases is ignored, and the nutrient elasticities are therefore overstated. Estimates for a rural south Indian sample indicate that this bias is considerable and that the true nutrient elasticities with respect to income may be close to zero.

Models of collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions are provided. The ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer. Cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models; coalitions of any size are viable, and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition. In addition, the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium. The optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition's size. These and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r.

The authors define "consensus" as the degree of agreement among point predictions aimed at the same target by different individuals and " "uncertainty" as the diffuseness of the corresponding probability distributions. This distinction is made operational with the aid of the NBERAASA survey data on matched point and probabilistic forecasts of inflation and the rate of change in gross national product. The means of the two sets of forecasts agree closely. Standard deviations of point forecasts tend to understate uncertainty as measured by standard deviations of the predictive probability distributions. However, these measures of consensus and uncertainty are on the whole positively correlated.

Application of some advances in econometrics (in the theory of cointegrated vector autoregressive models) enables us to deal effectively with two problems in rational-expectations, present-valu e models: nonstationarity of time series and incomplete data on infor mation of market participants. With U.S. data, the authors find some relatively encouraging new results for the rational-expectations theo ry of the term structure and some puzzling results for the present-va lue model of stock prices.

This study examines the relationships among firm growth, firm size, and firm age for a sample of manufacturing firms between 1976 and 1982. Firm growth is found to decrease with firm age and firm size. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions concerning the effects of sample censoring and the functional form of the growth relationship. The inverse growth-age relationship is consistent with a theory of firm learning proposed by Boyan Jovanovic while the inverse growth-size relationship is inconsistent with a number of theories that assume or imply Gibrat's law.

Private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the U.S. economy. The majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos (i.e., between living persons), but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior. This paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers. Two motives are considered: altruism and exchange. Evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior. Observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange-related motives. This finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well-being

This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion. The authors show that (1) the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid; (2) the winner faces a (linear) incenti ve contract; (3) the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost; and (4) the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner's announced expected cost

In this paper, a general-equilibrium business- cycle model is construct ed that, when subjected to real disturbances, mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output, money, business failures, risk pr emia, intermediary loans, and prices. In contrast, monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence, thus providing support for real business-cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle. Financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business-cycle behavior. A credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances

The three-factor, n-good model is displayed graphically and tested empirically. The three-dimensional endowment vectors and expansion paths are represented by points in an endowment triangle. Features of this endowment triangle determine relative factor returns, Rybczy nski and Stolper-Samuelson derivatives, output mixes, and the directi on of trade. The effects of mobile factors and nontraded goods are al so considered. Capital accumulation is shown to induce changes in out puts, trade, and the returns to factors that depend on the abundance of land relative to labor. Weak evidence for this 3 A n model is foun d in a 1978 U.N. data set on the value of output.

A standard demand-deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist.