To study the impact of macroprudential policy on credit supply cycles and real effects, we analyze dynamic provisioning. Introduced in Spain in 2000, revised four times, and tested in its countercyclicality during the crisis, it affected banks differentially. We find that dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in bad times, supports firm performance. A 1 percentage point increase in capital buffers extends credit to firms by 9 percentage points, increasing firm employment (6 percentage points) and survival (1 percentage point). Moreover, there are important compositional effects in credit supply related to risk and regulatory arbitrage by nonregulated and regulated but less affected banks.

We study the causal effect of school curricula on students? political attitudes, exploiting a major textbook reform in China between 2004 and 2010. The sharp, staggered introduction of the new curriculum across provinces allows us to identify its causal effects. We examine government documents articulating desired consequences of the reform and identify changes in textbooks reflecting these aims. A survey we conducted reveals that the reform was often successful in shaping attitudes, while evidence on behavior is mixed. Studying the new curriculum led to more positive views of China?s governance, changed views on democracy, and increased skepticism toward free markets.

Previous articleNext article FreeLucas Prize in Dynamic EconomicsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreThe Robert E. Lucas Jr. Prize is awarded biannually for the most interesting paper in the area of Dynamic Economics published in the Journal of Political Economy in the preceding two years. The prize was established in 2016 on the occasion of the celebration of Lucas’s seminal contributions to economics and his Phoenix Prize award.Papers published between August 2014 and June 2016 were considered for the first prize, which has been awarded to Boyan Jovanovic and Peter L. Rousseau for “Extensive and Intensive Investment over the Business Cycle” (Journal of Political Economy 122 [4]: 863–908).This paper empirically shows that extensive investment (i.e., the creation of new firms) rises with aggregate Tobin’s Q, while intensive investment (i.e., the investment of established firms) falls, and it provides a helpful model for understanding this novel fact. A more rapid technological change makes it harder to adapt existing capital. This raises Q and thereby provides new entrants with a comparative advantage. The authors match their model to investment series, including those by venture capitalists, and analyze the consequences for growth, welfare, and stock markets. The paper therefore makes a substantial contribution to understanding the dynamic economics of technological change and investment choices.Fig. 1. Prizewinners Boyan Jovanovic and Peter Rousseau after receiving the Robert E. Lucas Jr. Prize for their paper, “Extensive and Intensive Investment over the Business Cycle.” The prize was awarded at the Journal of Political Economy’s 125th anniversary reception during the 2017 ASSA Annual Meeting in Chicago. From left: Jovanovic, Lucas, and Rousseau.View Large ImageDownload PowerPoint Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 125, Number 1February 2017 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/691154 © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article

Next article FreeJournal of Political EconomyPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJournal of Political Economy acknowledges the assistance of:Daron AcemogluDaniel AckerbergSumit AgarwalAnna AizerUfuk AkcigitTreb AllenDouglas AlmondItai AshlagiEnghin AtalayDavid AtkinYu AwayaEduardo AzevedoPierre AzoulayManuel BaguesMiguel BallesterChristiane BaumeisterChristian BelzilDaniel BenjaminMark BilsLarry BlumeJaroslav BorovickaJohn BoundLeah BoustanChad BownBart BronnenbergBen BrooksEric BudishKonrad BurchardiDavid BurkMarshall BurkeColin CamererAndrew CaplinPedro CarneiroKatherine CaseyDeborah Cobb-ClarkTimothy CogleyOlivier CoibionShawn ColeGeorge ConstantinidesAdam CopelandThomas CovertSteven DavisJan De LoeckerMarco Del NegroMelissa DellMarco di MaggioRafael Di TellaJonathan DingelWill DobbieMark EganJason FabermanIvan Fernandez-ValChristian Fons-RosenAndrew FosterChao FuTitus GalamaDouglas GaleGerd GigerenzerUri GneezyLimor GolanYuriy GorodnichenkoDavid GreenDonald GreenMatthew GrennanJeff GroggerLuigi GuisoRong HaiYoram HalevyJames HamiltonJoseph HarringtonGlenn HarrisonMarc HenryKyle HerkenhoffJonas HjortElisabeth HonkaJohn Eric HumphriesYannis IoannidesNir JaimovichPrzemyslaw JeziorskiDavid JohnsonCharles JonesJoonhwi JooAlejandro JustinianoArturs KalninsLouis KaplowLoukas KarabarbounisTim KautzBen KeysPatrick KlineFuhito KojimaHideo KonishiWojciech KopczukMatthew KotchenNicolai KuminoffChristoph KuzmicsThibaut LamadonHoracio LarreguyLungFei LeePatrick LegrosThomas LemieuxRasmus LentzJacob LeshnoDanielle LiC.-Y. Cynthia Lin LawellMikael LindahlJohn ListLance LochnerAprajit MahajanGregor MatvosTimothy McQuadeNeil MehrotraStephan MeierGuido MenzioPascal MichaillatStelios MichalopoulosPedro MiraAnirban MitraAhmed MobarakEmanuel MoenchFrancesca MolinariAndreas MoxnesKathleen MullenTakeshi MurookaRoger MyersonPaulo NatenzonDerek NealChris NoskoMatthew NotowidigdoPhilip OreopoulosMatthew OsborneAmanda PallaisElias PapaioannouRonni PavanKaren PenceJohn PepperWolfgang PesendorferJorn-Steffen PischkeTomasz PiskorskiRobert PollakMaria PolyakovaDavid PorterMichael PowellVictoria ProwseBenjamin PugsleyNancy QianAnita RaoSergio RebeloRichard RobbArthur RobsonAdam RosenMark RosenzweigHeather RoyerAldo RustichiniBernard SalanieJames SalleeBen SandEmily SandsYuliy SannikovPaola SapienzaRichard SchmalenseeLawrence SchmidtMartin SchneiderAndrew ScottAmit SeruAnanth SeshadriRobert ShimerKelly ShuePaolo SiconolfiHolger SiegRui SilvaMichael SinkinsonGary SolonPaulo SomainiPeter SorensenStefanie StantchevaMelvin StephensJoerg StoyePer StrombergAmir SufiTakuo SugayaTavneet SuriJakob SvenssonBalazs SzentesChristopher TaberScott TaylorPetra ThiemannRebecca L. ThorntonSergio UrzuaRobert VallettaEllen VerbakelFrank VerbovenRobert VishnyXavier VivesPeter WakkerChristopher WaltersDavid WeilNoam YuchtmanJunsen ZhangOwen ZidarEric Zitzewitz Next article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 125, Number 1February 2017 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/691151 © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The purpose of this research is to examine how population-and episode-based alternative payment models affect equity in access to and outcomes for a range of surgical procedures.

This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial compensation, but not in cities where compensation was initially out of line with (measured) fundamentals. The response is more consistent with public aversion to high compensation than the effects of increased accountability