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Heterogeneity, Measurement Error, and Misallocation: Evidence from African Agriculture

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(1), 1-80 open access
Standard measures of productivity display enormous dispersion across farms in Africa. Crop yields and input intensities appear to vary greatly, seemingly in conflict with a model of efficient allocation across farms. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework for distinguishing between measurement error, unobserved heterogeneity, and potential misallocation. Using rich panel data from farms in Tanzania and Uganda, we estimate our model using a flexible specification in which we allow for several kinds of measurement error and heterogeneity. We find that measurement error and heterogeneity together account for a large fraction of the dispersion in measured productivity

Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(5), 1615-1639
Consumers rely on the price changes of goods in their grocery bundles when forming expectations about aggregate inflation. We use micro data that uniquely match individual expectations, detailed information about consumption bundles, and item-level prices. The weights consumers assign to price changes depend on the frequency of purchase, rather than expenditure share, and positive price changes loom larger than negative price changes. Prices of goods offered in the same store but not purchased do not affect inflation expectations, nor do other dimensions. Our results provide empirical guidance for models of expectations formation with heterogeneous consumers.

Privacy as a Public Good: A Case for Electronic Cash

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(7), 2157-2180 open access
Privacy is a feature inherent to the use of cash. With steadily increasing market shares of digital payment platforms, privacy in payments may no longer be attainable in the future. We explore the potential welfare impacts of reductions in privacy in payments. In our framework, firms may use data collected through payments to price discriminate future consumers. A public good aspect arises because individuals do not internalize the full cost of failing to protect their privacy and reduce social welfare by suboptimally choosing not to protect their privacy in payments. We discuss potential remedies, including the issuance of electronic cash.

Do Environmental Markets Improve on Open Access? Evidence from California Groundwater Rights

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(10), 2817-2860
Environmental markets are widely prescribed as an alternative to open access regimes for natural resources. We develop a model of dynamic groundwater extraction to demonstrate how a spatial regression discontinuity design that exploits a spatially incomplete market for groundwater rights recovers a lower bound on the market’s net benefit. We apply this estimator to a major aquifer in water-scarce southern California and find that a groundwater market generated substantial net benefits, as capitalized in land values. Heterogeneity analyses point to gains arising in part from rights trading, enabling more efficient water use across sectors. Additional findings suggest that the market increased groundwater levels.

Human Capital Investments and Expectations about Career and Family

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(5), 1361-1424 open access
We conducted a survey of high-ability college students and elicited beliefs about how their choice of major, and of whether to complete their degree, would affect an array of future events: earnings, employment, marriage prospects, potential spousal characteristics, and fertility. We find that students perceive large “returns” to human capital not only in their own future earnings but also in other dimensions (e.g., potential spouse’s earnings and fertility). We find evidence of students sorting into majors on the basis of these perceived returns. Family expectations are particularly important for female students’ major choices. In a follow-up survey conducted 6 years after the initial data collection, we find a close connection between expectations and current realizations.

JPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(10), 2993-2993
Previous articleNext article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection53%970%Reject with Reviews38%12210615%Revise9%19116947%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 452 days View Table Image Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 129, Number 10October 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/716775 Views: 702 © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

JPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(5), 1666-1666
Previous articleNext article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection52%970%Reject with Reviews40%11710113%Revise8%17715741%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 453 days View Table Image Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 129, Number 5May 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/714580 Views: 777 © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

JPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(4), 1318-1318
Previous articleNext article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection51%970%Reject with Reviews41%11710013%Revise8%17115140%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 438 days View Table Image Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 129, Number 4April 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/714078 Views: 790Total views on this site © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

2021 Lucas Prize Announcement

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(2), iii-iii
Previous articleNext article Free2021 Lucas Prize AnnouncementPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreThe Robert E. Lucas Jr. Prize is awarded biannually for the most interesting paper in the area of Dynamic Economics published in the Journal of Political Economy in the preceding two years. The prize was established in 2016 on the occasion of the celebration of Lucas’s seminal contributions to economics and his Phoenix Prize award.Papers published between August 2018 and June 2020 were considered for the third prize, which has been awarded to Charles I. Jones and Jihee Kim for “A Schumpeterian Model of Top Income Inequality” ( Journal of Political Economy 126 [5]: 1785–1826).This paper pertains to a topic that has received much attention as of late: why is income inequality at the top so high, and why has it risen sharply in the United States, though less so in other countries? The authors provide an empirical analysis and complement it with a model to understand the facts.The authors observe that top income inequality was relatively low and stable between 1960 and 1980 but then rose sharply in the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom. They argue that rising top income inequality to a great extent reflects rising labor income inequality, where labor income is broadly conceived and includes entrepreneurial income such as “business income.” The authors confirm that labor income is well described by a Pareto distribution, that is, that the expected income above some level is in a constant proportion relative to that level (see their fig. 4). The rising income inequality manifests itself in that this proportion has risen between 1980 and 2005.For their model, they focus on entrepreneurial activity and the resulting income as the driving force. They assume that a small share of entrepreneurs can turn their efforts into fast income growth, until they are replaced by competitors via creative destruction. This interplay produces the Pareto distribution and income inequality. They calculate the resulting efforts provided by entrepreneurs. Higher growth prospects and a lower creative destruction rate imply higher efforts as well as higher inequality. In their measurement, they calculate the contribution of each. A numerical approximation shows that the model can well account for the observed changes in income inequality. Ultimately, then, economic forces due to information technology, taxes, and policies related to innovation blocking may explain the varied patterns.This important paper is part of a growing literature that helps us more deeply understand the engines of growth, the sources of inequality, and their rich interplay. Policy choices seeking adjustments to one are likely to affect the other. Future research can build on the work by Jones and Kim to provide more detailed guidance. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 129, Number 2February 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/713243 Views: 375 © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article

JPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years

Journal of Political Economy 2021 129(8), 2453-2453
Previous articleNext article FreeJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two YearsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreJPE Turnaround Times, Previous Two Years Outcome of 1st Round DecisionsMean Days to DecisionMedian Days to DecisionDecision Later than Six Months after Submission (as percentage of decisions within decision type)Desk Rejection53%970%Reject with Reviews39%12010514%Revise8%18615945%Average time from original submission to acceptance (omitting time with author in revision) = 466 days Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 129, Number 8August 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/715839 Views: 517 © 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.