A long tradition in the development literature has been to associate the aggregate savings rate with the dependency ratio, the ratio of dependent children to adults. In this paper I formalize the relationship by developing a life-cycle model in which offspring are assets from the viewpoint of their parents. The model is used to help explain the increase in nineteenth-century U.S. savings rates. I find that between 1830 and 1900 about one-quarter of the 6-percentage-point rise in the savings rate can be attributed to a decline in the dependency rate.

All but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have been preceded, typically with a lag of around three-fourths of a year, by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum. This does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions. Evidence is presented, however, that even over the period 1948-72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious, supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the U.S. recessions prior to 1972. By extension, energy price increases may account for much of post-OPEC macroeconomic performance.

A long tradition in the development literature has been to associate the aggregate savings rate with the dependency ratio, the ratio of dependent children to adults. In this paper I formalize the relationship by developing a life-cycle model in which offspring are assets from the viewpoint of their parents. The model is used to help explain the increase in nineteenth-century U.S. savings rates. I find that between 1830 and 1900 about one-quarter of the 6-percentage-point rise in the savings rate can be attributed to a decline in the dependency rate.

Markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources, favorable climate, or location. The purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively. We examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion. We answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western U.S. coal in which two states (Montana and Wyoming) dominate production. We demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition (relative to a cartel). Nevertheless, even with two producing states competing against each other, significant rents can be captured--significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel.

Markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources, favorable climate, or location. The purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively. We examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion. We answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western U.S. coal in which two states (Montana and Wyoming) dominate production. We demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition (relative to a cartel). Nevertheless, even with two producing states competing against each other, significant rents can be captured--significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel.

All but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have been preceded, typically with a lag of around three-fourths of a year, by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum. This does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions. Evidence is presented, however, that even over the period 1948-72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious, supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the U.S. recessions prior to 1972. By extension, energy price increases may account for much of post-OPEC macroeconomic performance.

A general equilibrium model of optimal employment contracts is developed where firms have better information about labor's marginal product than workers. It is optimal for the wage to be tied to the level of employment, to prevent the firm from falsely stating that the marginal product is low and cutting the wage. It is shown that an observed aggregate shock that leads to an interindustry shift in labor demand and that would have no effect on total employment under symmetric information leads to a reduction in employment when firms and workers have asymmetric information.

A general equilibrium model of optimal employment contracts is developed where firms have better information about labor's marginal product than workers. It is optimal for the wage to be tied to the level of employment, to prevent the firm from falsely stating that the marginal product is low and cutting the wage. It is shown that an observed aggregate shock that leads to an interindustry shift in labor demand and that would have no effect on total employment under symmetric information leads to a reduction in employment when firms and workers have asymmetric information.