Social insurance is often linked to marriage. Existing evidence suggests small marital responses to financial incentives and stems from settings where benefits are realized in the near future. I analyze how linking survivors insurance to marriage affects the marriage market. Exploiting Sweden’s elimination of survivors insurance, I demonstrate that severing this link (1) affected entry into marriage up to 50 years before expected payout, (2) raised the divorce rate by 10%, and (3) raised the assortativeness of matching. This suggests that marital behavior is a key component of couples’ strategies to plan for financial security in old age.

We study the introduction of a noninvasive prenatal screening—cell-free DNA (cfDNA) screening—which is used to target a more costly invasive test that elevates miscarriage risk. Using Swedish administrative data, we document that coverage of cfDNA substantially increases cfDNA screening and reduces invasive testing. We develop and estimate a stylized model of prenatal choices and find that narrow targeting of cfDNA coverage can improve outcomes and reduce costs, while broader coverage also improves outcomes but with increased costs. These findings point to the potential gains from well-designed targeting of screening but at the same time highlight the importance of the targeting design.