Classical stable population theory, the standard model of population age structure and growth, is ill suited to addressing many issues that concern economists and demographers because it is a "one-sex" theory. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and dynamic stability of equilibrium in the birth matrix-mating rule (BMMR) model, a new model of age structure and growth for two-sex, monogamously mating, populations. The paper shows, by means of examples, that the BMMR model can have multiple nontrivial equilibria and establishes sufficient conditions for uniqueness. It generalizes a theorem of W. Brian Arthur to nonlinear systems and uses it to establish sufficient conditions for local dynamic stability.

Classical stable population theory, the standard model of population age structure and growth, is ill suited to addressing many issues that concern economists and demographers because it is a "one-sex" theory. This paper investigates the existence, uniqueness, and dynamic stability of equilibrium in the birth matrix-mating rule (BMMR) model, a new model of age structure and growth for two-sex, monogamously mating, populations. The paper shows, by means of examples, that the BMMR model can have multiple nontrivial equilibria and establishes sufficient conditions for uniqueness. It generalizes a theorem of W. Brian Arthur to nonlinear systems and uses it to establish sufficient conditions for local dynamic stability.

This paper introduces the 'separate spheres' bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of the authors' model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can--but need not--imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.

This paper introduces the "separate spheres" bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models (e.g., Manser-Brown, McElroy-Horney) in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can--but need not--imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.

A two-stage technology is a sequential production process that first uses pri mary inputs to produce intermediate inputs and then uses theintermediate inputs to produce final output. In this paper the authors show that two-stage technologies provide a general procedure for combining production functions or cost functions to obtain new specifications suitable for empirical production analysis. They investigate two new cost functions for which the input demand systemssatisfy global regularity conditions in a wide range of nondegenerate cases. Using six data sets, the authors estimate thesetwo input demand systems, both with and without imposing global regularity conditions, and find that one of them performs well.

Unequal access to financing for education may be an important source of educational differences. We develop a model relating sib schooling and earnings similarities to sibship size with and without equal access and estimate it for the education of veterans, for whom the GI Bill assured equal access, and for their children, who had no such government assistance. We find an inverse relationship between sibship size and sib schooling and earnings similarities for the children, but not for the veterans; we conclude that, in the absence of equal access policies, unequal access is an important source of educational differences.

This paper develops a general preference model for analyzing parental allocations of resources among their progeny. The implications fro this model for the distribution of educational resources and earnings potentials among siblings are examined. A particular version of the preference model is estimated using data on the education and earnings of adult male twins. The estimates imply that parents care about offsprings' earnings inequality and provide more (less) resources to the less (more) able than is consistent with an investment model.