The return on government debt is lower than that of assets with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute toward the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

This paper studies economies where firms acquire capital in primary markets and then, after idiosyncratic productivity shocks, retrade it in secondary markets that incorporate bilateral trade with search, bargaining, and liquidity frictions. We distinguish between full or partial sales (one firm gets all or some of the other’s capital) and document several long- and short-run empirical patterns between these variables and the cost of liquidity, as measured by inflation. Quantitatively, the model can match these patterns plus the standard business cycle facts. We also investigate the impact of search frictions, monetary and fiscal policy, persistence in shocks, and returns to scale.