This paper is to study the demand for money during the Chinese inflation of 1945-49. Based on the Chinese experience, the results confirm the hypothesis that during hyperinflation the expected rate of change in prices is the most important variable in the demand function for money. The estimated value of the coefficient of cash balances adjustment is close to one. Thus, the assumption that the desired level of real cash balances tends to equal the actual level during hyperinflation is supported.

The effectiveness of China's incremental industrial reform between 1980-89 is empirically investigated using a panel data set of 769 state enterprises from 36 2-digit industries. I derive and apply a method that measures marginal products of factors, changes in total factor productivity (TFP), and improvements in factor allocation between enterprises by comparing actual changes in output to actual changes in inputs. Under this approach, the production functions can differ arbitrarily across rms. Market power in product markets and deviations from efficient allocation of factors are also permitted. This study finds that there were marked improvements in marginal productivity of factors and in TFP between 1980-89, and that over 73 percent of output growth was attributable to TFP growth, and over 87 percent of TFP growth was attributable to improved incentives, intensified product market competition, and improvements in factor allocation.

The Lagos‐Wright model—a monetary model in which pairwise meetings alternate in time with a centralized meeting—has been extensively analyzed, but always using particular trading protocols. Here, trading protocols are replaced by two alternative notions of implementability: one that allows only individual defections and one that also allows cooperative defections in meetings. It is shown that the first‐best allocation is implementable under the stricter notion without taxation if people are sufficiently patient. And, if people are free to skip the centralized meeting, then lump‐sum taxation used to pay interest on money does not enlarge the set of implementable allocations.

The high and rising household savings rate in China is not easily reconciled with the traditional explanations that emphasize life cycle factors, the precautionary saving motive, financial development, or habit formation. This paper proposes a new competitive saving motive: as the sex ratio rises, Chinese parents with a son raise their savings in a competitive manner in order to improve their son's relative attractiveness for marriage. The pressure on savings spills over to other households. Both cross-regional and household-level evidence supports this hypothesis. This factor can potentially account for about half the actual increase in the household savings rate during 1990-2007.

The Great Leap Forward disaster, characterized by a collapse in grain production and a widespread famine in China between 1959 and 1961, is found attributable to a systemic failure in central planning. Wishfully expecting a great leap in agricultural productivity from collectivization, the Chinese government accelerated its aggressive industrialization timetable. Grain output fell sharply as the government diverted agricultural resources to industry and imposed an excessive grain procurement burden on peasants, leaving them with insufficient calories to sustain labor productivity. Our analysis shows that 61 percent of the decline in output is attributable to the policies of resource diversion and excessive procurement.

Tax evasion, by its very nature, is difficult to observe. We quantify the effects of tax rates on tax evasion by examining the relationship in China between the tariff schedule and the "evasion gap," which we define as the difference between Hong Kong's reported exports to China at the product level and China's reported imports from Hong Kong. Our results imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion. Furthermore, the evasion gap is negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products, suggesting that evasion takes place partly through misclassification of imports from higher-taxed categories to lower-taxed ones, in addition to underreporting the value of imports.

Motivated by the behavior of asset prices, trading volume, and price volatility during episodes of asset price bubbles, we present a continuous-time equilibrium model in which overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset buyer acquires an option to sell the asset to other agents when those agents have more optimistic beliefs. As in a paper by Harrison and Kreps, agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. In equilibrium, bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price volatility. Our analysis shows that while Tobin's tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility.

The return on government debt is lower than that of assets with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute toward the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

This paper studies economies where firms acquire capital in primary markets and then, after idiosyncratic productivity shocks, retrade it in secondary markets that incorporate bilateral trade with search, bargaining, and liquidity frictions. We distinguish between full or partial sales (one firm gets all or some of the other’s capital) and document several long- and short-run empirical patterns between these variables and the cost of liquidity, as measured by inflation. Quantitatively, the model can match these patterns plus the standard business cycle facts. We also investigate the impact of search frictions, monetary and fiscal policy, persistence in shocks, and returns to scale.