Knowledge that Transforms

We extend life cycle models of human capital investments by incorporating matching theory to examine the sorting pattern of heterogeneous scientists into different career trajectories. We link differences in physical capital investments and complementarities between basic and applied scientists across industry and academic settings to individual differences in scientist ability and preferences to predict an equilibrium matching of scientists to careers and to their earnings evolution. Our empirical analysis, using the National Science Foundation's Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System database, is consistent with theoretical predictions of (i) sorting by ability into basic versus applied science among academic scientists, but not among industry scientists; and (ii) sorting by higher taste for nonmonetary returns into academia over industry. The evolution of an earnings profile is consistent with these sorting patterns: the earnings trajectories of basic and applied scientists are distinct from each other in academia but are similar in industry.

Using novel transaction-level data on Chinese business groups, this study provides the first direct evidence of the coinsurance theory of business groups by investigating when different types of internal resources are transferred within a business group. We find that in Chinese business groups, a credit crunch experienced by the controlling shareholding firm (the “controller”) of a publicly listed firm increases the loan-based related party transactions (RPTs) including loan guarantees and intercorporate loans provided by the listed firm to the controller. In turn, when the listed firm's performance dips, the controller and its son firms provide more support to the listed firm in the form of non-loan-based RPTs. These findings directly show the dynamic interactions of members within business groups.

Business groups are key sources of innovation in emerging market economies, but we understand little about why innovativeness differs across groups and over time. Variation in the density of intragroup buyer–supplier ties, which are common structural linkages among group affiliates, can help explain both cross-sectional and temporal heterogeneity of group innovativeness. We argue that greater buyer–supplier density within a group initially creates combinatorial opportunities that contribute to group innovativeness but ultimately generates combinatorial exhaustion that constrains innovation. Combinatorial exhaustion will set in at lower levels of density as the market environment becomes more developed because the opportunity costs of local search increase. The research introduces a dynamic argument to studies of business-group innovation.

In today's multibrand, multichannel marketplace, optimal channel design involves issues such as distribution intensity, channel exclusivity, vertical and horizontal coordination, and online–offline mixed structures. We investigate how a firm's choice in these design issues affects its profitability under varying levels of brand and outlet differentiation. Our spatial model explicitly captures heterogeneous consumer preference for brand position, store location, and outlet type, under various consumer behavior assumptions. We apply this same underlying model to 10 different channel structures, deriving associated demand functions and equilibrium solutions. We perform a meta-analysis over the entire set of results to estimate a general model that summarizes the linkages among the factors shaping optimal channel structure decisions in a multibrand, multioutlet market. This general model efficiently describes the complex interactions of channel characteristics with industry structure and consumer characteristics, providing new findings as well as greater clarity to some results in the literature. A predictive analysis applied to additional channel structures exhibits strong generalizability in qualitative findings.

The nature of utility is controversial. Whereas decision theory commonly assumes that utility is context specific, applied and empirical decision analysis typically assumes one unifying concept of utility applicable to all decision problems. This controversy has hardly been addressed empirically because of the absence of methods to measure utility outside the context of risk. We introduce a method to measure utility over time and compare utility under risk and utility over time. We distinguish between gains and losses and also measure loss aversion. In two experiments we found that utility under risk and utility over time differed and were uncorrelated. Utility under risk was more curved than utility over time. Subjects were loss averse both for risk and for time, but loss aversion was more pronounced for risk. Loss aversion over risk and time were uncorrelated. This suggests that loss aversion, although important in both decision contexts, is volatile and subject to framing.

We exploit changes in wind speeds at surfing locations in Switzerland as a source of variation in users' propensity to post content about their surfing activity on an online social network. We exploit this variation to test whether users' online content-generation activity is codetermined with their social ties. Economically significant effects of this type can produce positive feedback that generates local network effects in content generation. When quantitatively significant, the increased content and tie density arising from the network effect induces more visitation and browsing on the site, which fuels growth by generating advertising revenue. We find evidence consistent with such network effects.

Competition among firms yields many benefits but can also encourage firms to engage in corrupt or unethical activities. We argue that competition can lead organizations to provide services that customers demand but that violate government regulations, especially when price competition is restricted. Using 28 million vehicle emissions tests from more than 11,000 facilities, we show that increased competition is associated with greater inspection leniency, a service quality attribute that customers value but is illegal and socially costly. Firms with more competitors pass customer vehicles at higher rates and are more likely to lose customers whom they fail, suggesting that competition intensifies pressure on facilities to provide illegal leniency. We also show that, at least in markets in which pricing is restricted, firms use corrupt and unethical practices as an entry strategy.

The importance of networks in labor markets is well known, and their job-segregating effects in organizations is a given. Conventional wisdom attributes this segregation to the homophilous nature of contact networks, and leaves little role for organizational influences. Yet employee referrals are necessarily initiated within a firm by employee referrers subject to organizational policies. We build theory regarding the role of referrers in the segregating effects of network recruitment. Using mathematical and computational models, we investigate how empirically documented referrer behaviors affect job segregation. We show that referrer behaviors can segregate jobs beyond the effects of homophilous network recruitment. Furthermore, and contrary to past understandings, we show that referrer behaviors can also mitigate most, if not all, of the segregating effects of network recruitment. Although largely neglected in previous labor market network scholarship, referrers are the missing links revealing opportunities for organizations to influence the effects of network recruitment. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen. organizations.

It is commonly believed that piracy of information goods leads to lower profits, which translate to lower incentives to invest in innovation and eventually to lower-quality products. Manufacturers, policy makers, and researchers all claim that inadequate piracy enforcement efforts translate to lower investments in product development. However, we find many practical examples that contradict this claim. Therefore, to examine this claim more carefully, we develop a rigorous economic model of the manufacturer's quality decision problem in the presence of piracy. We consider a monopolist who does not have any marginal costs but has a product development cost quadratic in the quality level produced. The monopolist faces a consumer market heterogeneous in its preference for quality and offers a quality level that maximizes its profit. We also allow for the possibility that the manufacturer may use versioning to counter piracy. We unexpectedly find that in certain situations, lower piracy enforcement increases the monopolist's incentive to invest in quality. We explain the reasons and welfare implications of our findings.

We analyze a rational expectations equilibrium model to explore the implications of information networks for the financial market. When information is exogenous, social communication improves market efficiency. However, social communication crowds out information production due to traders' incentives to “free ride” on informed friends and on a more informative price system. Overall, social communication hurts market efficiency when information is endogenous. The network effects on the cost of capital, liquidity, trading volume, and welfare are also sensitive to whether information is endogenous. Our analysis highlights the importance of information acquisition in examining the implications of information networks for financial markets.