Knowledge that Transforms

Marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels. This study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms' incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information. We show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm. In addition, sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior: the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case, whereas the follower ex ante reveals less (more) private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low (high). We also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare. We demonstrate that there may be a U-shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits (or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly) and the disclosure cost. Moreover, in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case, sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition, improving both firm profitability and social welfare.

This descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function, i.e., the use of employee (“direct”) salespeople rather than manufacturers' representatives (“reps”). A hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature. Data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 U.S. sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of “going direct” in a given district. Results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well. The transaction cost model is generally supported. The principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson's performance, the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism, i.e., to use a direct sales force. Among other findings, direct sales forces are also associated with complex, hard-to-learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities. Several factors prove unrelated, including company size, the amount of travel a district requires, and the importance of key accounts. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 234–254, in 1985.

This paper defines a unique type of product or service offering, termed probabilistic goods, and analyzes a novel selling strategy, termed probabilistic selling (PS). A probabilistic good is not a concrete product or service but an offer involving a probability of getting any one of a set of multiple distinct items. Under the probabilistic selling strategy, a multi-item seller creates probabilistic goods using the existing distinct products or services and offers such probabilistic goods as additional purchase choices. The probabilistic selling strategy allows sellers to benefit from introducing a new type of buyer uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty in product assignments. First, introducing such uncertainty enables sellers to create a “virtual” product or service (i.e., probabilistic good), which opens up a creative way to segment a market. We find that the probabilistic selling strategy is a general marketing tool that has the potential to benefit sellers in many different industries. Second, this paper shows that creating buyer uncertainty in product assignments is a new way for sellers to deal with their own market uncertainty. We illustrate two such benefits: (a) offering probabilistic goods can reduce the seller's information disadvantage and lessen the negative effect of demand uncertainty on profit, and (b) offering probabilistic goods can solve the mismatch between capacity and demand and enhance efficiency. Emerging technology is creating exciting (previously unfeasible) opportunities to implement PS and to obtain these many advantages.

Most supermarket firms choose to position themselves by offering either everyday low prices (EDLP) across several items or offering temporary price reductions (promotions) on a limited range of items. While this choice has been addressed from a theoretical perspective in both the marketing and economic literature, relatively little is known about how these decisions are made in practice, especially within a competitive environment. This paper exploits a unique store level data set consisting of every supermarket operating in the United States in 1998. For each of these stores, we observe the pricing strategy the firm has chosen to follow, as reported by the firm itself. Using a system of simultaneous discrete choice models, we estimate each store's choice of pricing strategy as a static discrete game of incomplete information. In contrast to the predictions of the theoretical literature, we find strong evidence that firms cluster by strategy by choosing actions that agree with those of its rivals. We also find a significant impact of various demographic and store/chain characteristics, providing some qualified support for several specific predictions from marketing theory.

The two main influences leading to adoption at the individual consumer level are marketing communication and interpersonal communication. Although evidence of the effect of these two influences is abundant at the market level, there is a paucity of research documenting the simultaneous effect of both influences at the individual consumer level. Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by documenting the existence and magnitude of both influences at the individual customer level while controlling for unobserved temporal effects. The pharmaceutical industry provides an appropriate context to study this problem. It has been conjectured that adoption and usage patterns of a new drug by physicians—“contagion”—acts as a “consumption externality,” as it allows a given physician to learn about the efficacy and use of the drug. In addition, pharmaceutical companies target individual physicians via marketing activities such as detailing, sampling, and direct-to-consumer advertising. Our data contain the launch of a new drug from an important drug category. We chose two unrelated markets (Manhattan and Indianapolis) for our empirical analysis. We model an individual physician's decision to adopt a new drug in a given time period as a binary choice decision. This decision is modeled as a function of temporal trends (linear and quadratic) and individual physician-level contagion and marketing activity (both individual level and market level). Our contagion measure aggregates the adoption behavior of geographically near physicians for each physician in our sample. Our results from the Manhattan market indicate that both targeted communication and contagion have an effect on the individual physician's adoption decision. A major challenge is to rule out alternative explanations for the detected contagion effect. We therefore carry out a series of tests and show that this effect persists even after we control for the effects of time, individual salespeople, other marketing instruments, local market effects, and the effects of some institutional factors. We believe that our contagion effect arises because the consumption externality is stronger for geographically close physicians. We discuss some underlying processes that are probably giving rise to the contagion effect we detected. Finally, we compute the social multiplier of marketing and find it to be about 11%. We also use the estimated parameters to compare the relative effect of contagion and targeted marketing. We find that marketing plays a large (relative) role in affecting early adoption. However, the role of contagion dominates from month 4 onward and, by month 17 (or about half the duration of our data), asymptotes to about 90% of the effect.

For marketers, television remains the most important advertising medium. This paper proposes a two-sided model of the television industry. We estimate viewer demand for programs on one side and advertiser demand for audiences on the other. The primary objective is to understand how each group's program usage influences the other group. Four main conclusions emerge. First, viewers tend to be averse to advertising. When a highly rated network decreases its advertising time by 10%, our model predicts a median audience gain of about 25% (assuming no competitive reactions). Second, we find the price elasticity of advertising demand is −2.9, substantially more price elastic than 30 years ago. Third, we compare our estimates of advertiser and viewer preferences for program characteristics to networks' observed program choices. Our results suggest that advertiser preferences influence network choices more strongly than viewer preferences. Viewers' two most preferred program genres, Action and News, account for just 16% of network program hours. Advertisers' two most preferred genres, Reality and Comedy, account for 47% of network program hours. Fourth, we perform a counterfactual experiment in which some viewers gain access to a hypothetical advertisement avoidance technology. The results suggest that ad avoidance tends to increase equilibrium advertising quantities and decrease network revenues.

This paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product. Our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response. In particular we show that if products can be represented by their position in a multiattribute space, consumers are heterogeneous and maximize utility, and awareness advertising and distribution can be summarized by response functions, then for the profit maximizing firm: it is optimal to decrease awareness advertising, it is optimal to decrease the distribution budget unless the new product can be kept out of the market, a price increase may be optimal, and even under the optimal strategy, profits decrease as a result of the competitive new product. Furthermore, if the consumer tastes are uniformly distributed across the spectrum a price decrease increases defensive profits, it is optimal (at the margin) to improve product quality in the direction of the defending product's strength and it is optimal (at the margin) to reposition by advertising in the same direction. In addition we provide practical procedures to estimate (1) the distribution of consumer tastes and (2) the position of the new product in perceptual space from sales data and knowledge of the percent of consumers who are aware of the new product and find it available. Competitive diagnostics, such as the angle of attack, are introduced to help the defending manager. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 2, Issue 4, pages 319–360, in 1983.

This paper describes a new data set available to academic researchers (at the following website: http://mktsci.pubs.informs.org ). These data are comprised of store sales and consumer panel data for 30 product categories. The store sales data contain 5 years of product sales, pricing, and promotion data for all items sold in 47 U.S. markets. In two U.S. markets, the store level data are supplemented with panel-level purchase data and cover the entire population of stores. Further information is available regarding store characteristics in these markets. We address several potential applications of these data, as well as the access protocol. The data set described in this paper is maintained by IRI. Any fees charged by IRI for the distribution of the data set will be used for the continual maintenance and updating of the data. Scholarships to cover IRI's fees (for those who need it) are available through the INFORMS Society for Marketing Science (ISMS). Please see the website above for further details.

This paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life. A hierarchical model is developed, and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies. The paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal. These include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted. The paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination, but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand. Therefore, such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi-retailer environment. It is proven, however, that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi-retailer environment. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 4, Issue 2, pages 166–176, in 1985.

This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on Nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store. Static linear demand and cost functions are assumed, and a number of rules about players' expectations of competitors' behavior are examined. It is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure. For low degrees of substitutability, each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store; for more highly competitive goods, manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 2, Issue 2, pages 161–191, in 1983.