Anew model of consumer behavior is developed using a hybrid of cognitive psychology and microeconomics. The development of the model starts with the mental coding of combinations of gains and losses using the prospect theory value function. Then the evaluation of purchases is modeled using the new concept of “transaction utility.” The household budgeting process is also incorporated to complete the characterization of mental accounting. Several implications to marketing, particularly in the area of pricing, are developed. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 4, Issue 3, pages 199–214, in 1985.
The authors study the takeoff of 16 new products across 31 countries (430 categories) to analyze how and why takeoff varies across products and countries. They test the effect of 12 hypothesized drivers of takeoff using a parametric hazard model. The authors find that the average time to takeoff varies substantially between developed and developing countries, between work and fun products, across cultural clusters, and over calendar time. Products take off fastest in Japan and Norway, followed by other Nordic countries, the United States, and some countries of Midwestern Europe. Takeoff is driven by culture and wealth plus product class, product vintage, and prior takeoff. Most importantly, time to takeoff is shortening over time and takeoff is converging across countries. The authors discuss the implications of these findings.
While retailers have sales data to forecast demand, manufacturers have a broad understanding of the market and the coming trends. It is well known that pooling such demand information within a distribution channel improves supply chain logistics. However, little is known about how information-sharing affects wholesale pricing incentives. In this paper, we investigate a channel structure where a manufacturer and two retailers have private signals of the state of the demand. Our model identifies the presence of a pricing distortion, which we term the inference effect, when a manufacturer sets price to an uninformed retailer. Because of this inference effect, the manufacturer would like to set a low wholesale price to signal to the retailer that the demand is low. On the other hand, the manufacturer would like to set a high wholesale price so that he earns the optimal margin on each unit sold. Vertical information sharing benefits the manufacturer by eliminating the distortion caused by the inference effect, which is more profound in a channel whose retailer has a noisier signal. This result implies that when there is a cost associated with transmitting information, the manufacturer may choose to share information with only the less-informed retailer rather than with both.
Amultinomial logit model of brand choice, calibrated on 32 weeks of purchases of regular ground coffee by 100 households, shows high statistical significance for the explanatory variables of brand loyalty, size loyalty, presence/absence of store promotion, regular shelf price and promotional price cut. The model is parsimonious in that the coefficients of these variables are modeled to be the same for all coffee brand-sizes. The calibrated model predicts remarkably well the share of purchases by brand-size in a hold-out sample of 100 households over the 32-week calibration period and a subsequent 20-week forecast period. The success of the model is attributed in part to the level of detail and completeness of the household panel data employed, which has been collected through optical scanning of the Universal Product Code in supermarkets. Three short-term market response measures are calculated from the model: regular (depromoted) price elasticity of share, percent increase in share for a promotion with a median price cut, and promotional price cut elasticity of share. Response varies across brand-sizes in a systematic way with large share brand-sizes showing less response in percentage terms but greater in absolute terms. On the basis of the model a quantitative picture emerges of groups of loyal customers who are relatively insensitive to marketing actions and a pool of switchers who are quite sensitive. This article was originally published in Marketing Science, Volume 2, Issue 3, pages 203–238, in 1983.
In this paper, we develop a structural model of household behavior in an environment where there is uncertainty about brand attributes and both prices and advertising signal brand quality. Four quality signaling mechanisms are at work: (1) price signals quality, (2) advertising frequency signals quality, (3) advertising content provides direct (but noisy) information about quality, and (4) use experience provides direct (but noisy) information about quality. We estimate our proposed model using scanner panel data on ketchup. If price is important as a signal of brand quality, then frequent price promotion may have the unintended consequence of reducing brand equity. We use our estimated model to measure the importance of such effects. Our results imply that price is an important quality-signaling mechanism and that frequent price cuts can have significant adverse effects on brand equity. The role of advertising frequency in signaling quality is also significant, but it is less quantitatively important than price. In the printed version of Marketing Science, Vol. 27, No. 6, Erdem et al. (2008) was mistakenly identified as a Research Note. It is a regular article and has been corrected here and in the online table of contents.
The motion picture industry is characterized by a dynamic market environment, limited shelf space and product category management, and consequently, complex channel contracts specifying the split of box office revenue between distributors and exhibitors. Although such a contracting practice creates a considerable administrative effort and channel conflict, it is not clear whether such complexity is necessary for superior channel performance. This study investigates this question by analyzing the impact of movie contract structure on movie scheduling and channel member profitability. We develop and analyze a game-theoretic model using the genetic algorithm approach and a decision support system, SilverScreener, to capture strategic behaviors of channel members in a complex market environment. We find that simpler two-part tariff or 50/50 split contracts perform as well as the current contracts. Thus, the complexity of the market environment need not be reflected in the complexity of the channel contracts. Channel contract structure has significant impact on channel member profitability and the exhibitor's movie-scheduling behavior. In particular, our results indicate that the flat rate contract structure represents an attractive alternative to the current practice for distributors.