Knowledge that Transforms

Management‐by‐walking‐around (MBWA) is a widely adopted technique in hospitals that involves senior managers directly observing frontline work. However, few studies have rigorously examined its impact on organizational outcomes. This study examines an improvement program based on MBWA in which senior managers observe frontline employees, solicit ideas about improvement opportunities, and work with staff to resolve the issues. We randomly selected hospitals to implement the 18‐month‐long, MBWA‐based improvement program; 56 work areas participated. We find that the program, on average, had a negative impact on performance. To explain this surprising finding, we use mixed methods to examine the impact of the work area's problem‐solving approach. Results suggest that prioritizing easy‐to‐solve problems was associated with improved performance. We believe this was because it resulted in greater action‐taking. A different approach was characterized by prioritizing high‐value problems, which was not successful in our study. We also find that assigning to senior managers responsibility for ensuring that identified problems get resolved resulted in better performance. Overall, our study suggests that senior managers' physical presence in their organizations' front lines was not helpful unless it enabled active problem solving.

We address the use and value of time and temperature information to manage perishables in the context of a retailer that sells a random lifetime product subject to stochastic demand and lost sales. The product's lifetime is largely determined by the temperature history and the flow time through the supply chain. We compare the case in which information on flow time and temperature history is available and used for inventory management to a base case in which such information is not available. We formulate the two cases as Markov Decision Processes and evaluate the value of information through an extensive simulation using representative, real world supply chain parameters.

This paper studies the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance (SCP) in the two‐party newsvendor setting. We extend prior fairness analysis to a wide range of demand distributions, and also allow the degree and definition of fairness to assume a broader range of preferences than those in prior literature. Contrary to prior literature, we find that if the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is not sufficiently large, regardless of demand variability, a fair‐minded retailer makes no difference to system efficiency when facing a traditional profit‐maximizing supplier. Only when the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is above a threshold can the retailer's fairness concern improve the system efficiency for sufficiently high demand uncertainty. In order for the retailer's fairness concern to improve expected profits of both parties compared to the traditional supply chain case (win–win), the demand uncertainty cannot be too low, the retailer is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity, and his ideal allocation to the supplier is within a specific range. If only the supplier is concerned for fairness, the results range from worsening to improving (but not coordinating) the system and a win–win situation is impossible. Finally, when both the supplier and retailer are fair‐minded, SCP is improved unless both parties prefer to allocate small portions of system profit to the other. Again, win–win will be achieved only when the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high, the retailer's ideal allocation is within a certain range, and he is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity.

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.

Dynamic pricing enables a firm to increase revenue by better matching supply with demand, responding to shifting demand patterns, and achieving customer segmentation. In the last 20 years, numerous success stories of dynamic pricing applications have motivated a rapidly growing research interest in a variety of dynamic pricing problems in the academic literature. A large class of problems that arise in various revenue management applications involve selling a given amount of inventory over a finite time horizon without inventory replenishment. In this study, we identify most recent trends in dynamic pricing research involving such problems. We review existing research on three new classes of problems that have attracted a rapidly growing interest in the last several years, namely, problems with multiple products, problems with competition, and problems with limited demand information. We also identify a number of possible directions for future research.

Information sharing in supply chains has become an important topic over the past decade. This study uses data from 617 Chinese manufacturing firms to investigate the relationships among competitive environments, supply chain information sharing (SCIS), and supply chain performance. The results of structural equation modeling analysis show that (i) international competition is positively related to all three types of SCIS whereas local competition is not significantly related to any of the three types, (ii) internal information sharing is positively related to external information sharing with suppliers and customers, and (iii) internal information sharing and information sharing with customers are positively related to superior supply chain performance, whereas supplier information sharing is not significantly related to performance. The findings enhance our understanding of the relationships among competitive environment, SCIS, and supply chain performance in Chinese manufacturing settings.

Advertising is a crucial tool for demand creation and market expansion. When a manufacturer uses a retailer as a channel for reaching end customers, the advertising strategy takes on an additional dimension: which party will perform the advertising to end customers. Cost sharing (“co‐operative advertising”) arrangements proliferate the option by decoupling the execution of the advertising from its funding. We examine the efficacy of cost sharing in a model of two competing manufacturer–retailer supply chains who sell partially substitutable products that may differ in market size. Some counterintuitive findings suggest that the firms performing the advertising would rather bear the costs entirely if this protects their unit profit margin. We also evaluate the implications of advertising strategy for overall supply chain efficiency and consumer welfare.

This study investigates the roles of bank and trade credits in a supply chain with a capital‐constrained retailer facing demand uncertainty. We evaluate the retailer's optimal order quantity and the creditors' optimal credit limits and interest rates in two scenarios. In the single‐credit scenario, we find the retailer prefers trade credit, if the trade credit market is more competitive than the bank credit market; otherwise, the retailer's preference of a specific credit type depends on the risk levels that the retailer would divert trade credit and bank credit to other risky investments. In the dual‐credit scenario, if the bank credit market is more competitive than the trade credit market, the retailer first borrows bank credit prior to trade credit, but then switches to borrowing trade credit prior to bank credit as the retailer's internal capital declines. In contrast, if the trade credit market is more competitive, the retailer borrows only trade credit. We further analytically prove that the two credits are complementary if the retailer's internal capital is substantially low but become substitutable as the internal capital grows, and then empirically validate this prediction based on a panel of 674 firms in China over the period 2001–2007.

To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising , we study how the optimal assortment of a retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects its assortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase and keep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortment has a distinct structure for relatively strict return policies: it is optimal to offer a mix of the most popular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed as a form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high or when returns are disallowed, the optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a common finding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results: more eccentric products have higher probability of return—conditional on purchase. In light of our analytical findings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take returns into account when merchandising.