Knowledge that Transforms

We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well‐known off‐the‐shelf commercial software.

We investigate a supply chain system with a common supplier selling to downstream retailers who are engaged in both price and inventory competition. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium for the retailer game and study how a supplier can coordinate the system to achieve the best performance. Our main conclusions are as follows: First, a buyback contract can be used to coordinate retailers competing on both price and inventory in a sense that optimal retail prices and inventory levels arise as the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. With symmetric retailers, the system optimum arises as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Second, the particular type of competition experienced by retailers (price versus inventory competition) affects the characteristics of the contract. Specifically, strong price competition leads to a coordination mechanism with a positive buyback rate, where the supplier subsidizes retailers for leftover inventories; however, strong inventory competition leads to a negative buyback rate, where retailers are punished for overstocking. Using a linear expected demand function, we further explore the impact of system parameters on the coordination contract and the competitive equilibrium. We also find that the performance of the supplier's optimal contract is asymptotic to the system optimal coordination contract as competition becomes fierce.

We consider replenishment decisions for a constant rate demand environment from a supplier with uncertain lead times. We study the potential use of a flexible backup supplier as an emergency response to accurate lead‐time information arriving at (or close after) the beginning of the demand interval and well after an original order with the stochastic lead‐time supplier has been placed. The emergency response decisions involve whether to order and how much from the flexible backup supplier, with the objective of minimizing the cost of meeting demand. We derive the optimal emergency‐response policy and clearly outline its implications on the optimized safety lead time of the original order placement and on the cost of meeting demand. We examine the impact on the use of the flexible backup supplier of factors like the arrival time of accurate lead‐time information and the response lead time of the backup supplier. We further study the potential benefits of the use of the flexible backup supplier in a dual role: as one of the two suppliers in a redundant supply system assigned to originally meet the demand and as an emergency response to later‐arriving lead‐time information. Our numerical studies illustrate the benefits from the use of the flexible backup supplier as an emergency response, but for reasonable purchase premiums and short lead times of flexible backup supply options, their use in a dual (regular and emergency response) role often leads to improved performance over safety lead‐time single and uncertain lead‐time supplier‐replenishment strategies. The benefits of the backup supply options are accentuated the higher the lead‐time uncertainty of the stochastic lead‐time supplier is.

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.

We report on a cross‐sectional and longitudinal comparison of European distribution centers in the Netherlands. European distribution centers are responsible for the distribution of a manufacturer's (mostly Asian or American) products over customers in a large part of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, often with strict service‐level agreements. In total, 65 physical warehouses, containing 140 European, Asian, and American European distribution center operations, in combination with different outsourcing relations (own‐account, dedicated outsourced, and public outsourced), were benchmarked in 2000 and monitored over the period 2000–2004. We conclude that both in 2000 and 2004, European warehouses are more efficient than Asian and American warehouses, and outsourced operations (particularly public warehouses) are more efficient than own‐account operations. Over the period 2000–2004, efficiency appears to have declined substantially; the most distinct differences are to be found among public outsourced warehouses and, because many European distribution center warehouse operations of European origin are run by public service providers, among European warehouses. This decline in efficiency also led to a decline in productivity, in spite of the fact that overall the available technology has improved. We conjecture potential causes for this decline.

We identify and analyze a scenario where a firm first opens up what we call a “detached” market, by offering a new product that meets a customer need that is very different from (i.e., detached from) the need met by the old established product. Our analysis builds on the previous studies that describe alternate ways in which a new product might open a new market and ultimately encroach on an existing market. Consider the example of cell phones: They opened up a new detached market by meeting the customer need for mobility, a need very different from the traditional attribute of reception quality. By meeting an important detached need, a new product can sell at a high price, even though it might be woefully deficient with regard to the traditional performance dimension (the reception/coverage of early cell phones was sorely lacking). A person who is a high‐end customer for the old product initially despises the new product as a replacement for the old one but might simultaneously be one of the first customers for the new product because it fills the detached‐market need. Over time, the new product improves along the traditional dimension (e.g., cell phone reception/coverage has dramatically improved), and eventually it becomes a replacement for the old product, encroaching from the lower end upward (the first customers to drop their landlines have been lower‐end customers such as students and apartment dwellers, whereas higher‐end business customers still have landlines in their offices). We call this the detached‐market form of low‐end encroachment and show how it helps explain the conundrum of an expensive “disruptive” innovation. We go on to relate our results to the finding that “willingness to cannibalize” is a key factor in an incumbent firm's growth and survival, and to the “blue ocean strategy.”

The celebrated model of Gallego and van Ryzin is specialized to the case of constant elasticity of demand. A closed form is developed, which has an even simpler form than that arising with exponential demand and which possesses an excellent approximation. In this environment, monopoly is efficient, which means that all the behavior usually attributed to monopoly pricing is actually a consequence of efficient pricing and would arise even in a perfectly competitive environment. If the initial supply is not too large, consumers have no incentive to delay their purchases to get a lower price at the average inventory prevailing at any time.

It is well known that maximizing revenue from a fixed stock of perishable goods may require discounting prices rather than allowing unsold inventory to perish. This behavior is seen in industries ranging from fashion retail to tour packages and baked goods. A number of authors have addressed the markdown management problem in which a seller seeks to determine the optimal sequence of discounts to maximize the revenue from a fixed stock of perishable goods. However, merchants who consistently use markdown policies risk training customers to “wait for the sale.” We investigate models in which the decision to sell inventory at a discount will change the future expectations of customers and hence their buying behavior. We show that, in equilibrium, a single‐price policy is optimal if all consumers are strategic and demand is known to the seller. Relaxing any of these conditions can lead to a situation in which a two‐price markdown policy is optimal. We show using numerical simulation that if customers update their expectations of availability over time, then optimal sales limit policies can evolve in a complex fashion.

Drawing from three theoretical bases—“information stickiness” from the knowledge management literature, “service coproduction” from the service operations management literature, and “incomplete contract theory” from the transaction cost economics literature—we discuss a theoretical framework and develop models to study the efficiency of the service coproduction process in a knowledge‐intensive consulting environment. We apply, refine, and interpret these theories to determine how work should be allocated between the consultant and the client and the corresponding pricing under different contractual relationships that occur in this industry. We find that, with a pricing schedule that relates the fee adjustment to the self‐service level and one party's ownership of the residual right to specify the workload allocation, the client underinvests her efforts in the service coproduction process, whereas the consultant overinvests his efforts, resulting in an inefficient process. In addition, to improve overall process efficiency, we show that the more productive party should own the residual right to respecify the self‐service level when the final service need emerges. Our results, as well as interview data from experienced consultants, provide insights into the causes of inefficient service delivery processes and offer direction for achieving better efficiency through contract design and pricing schedules.

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory‐related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back‐ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy‐type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems—deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review ( Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies—and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.