Knowledge that Transforms

Motion silencing is a striking and unexplained visual illusion wherein changes that are otherwise salient become difficult to perceive when the changing elements also move. We develop a new method for quantifying illusion strength (Experiments 1a and 1b), and we demonstrate a privileged role for rotational motion on illusion strength compared with highly controlled stimuli that lack rotation (Experiments 2a to 3b). These contrasts make it difficult to explain the illusion in terms of lower-level detection limits. Instead, we explain the illusion as a failure to attribute changes to locations. Rotation exacerbates the illusion because its perception relies upon structured object representations. This aggravates the difficulty of attributing changes by demanding that locations are referenced relative to both an object-internal frame and an external frame. Two final experiments (4a and 4b) add support to this account by employing a synchronously rotating external frame of reference that diminishes otherwise strong motion silencing. All participants were Johns Hopkins University undergraduates.

Understanding how initiatives to support Black-owned businesses are received, and why, has important social and economic implications. To address this, we designed three experiments to investigate the role of antiegalitarian versus egalitarian ideologies among White American adults. In Study 1 ( N = 199), antiegalitarianism (vs. egalitarianism) predicted viewing initiatives supporting a Black-owned business as less fair, but only when the business was competing with other (presumably White-owned) businesses. In Study 2 ( N = 801), antiegalitarianism predicted applying survival-of-the-fittest market beliefs, particularly to Black-owned businesses. Antiegalitarianism also predicted viewing initiatives supporting Black-owned businesses as less fair than initiatives that targeted other (presumably White-owned) businesses, especially for tangible (vs. symbolic) support that directly impacts the success of a business. In Study 3 ( N = 590), antiegalitarianism predicted rejecting a program investing in Black-owned businesses. These insights demonstrate how antiegalitarian ideology can have the effect of maintaining race-based inequality, hindering programs designed to reduce that inequality.

The tendency for people to consider themselves morally good while behaving selfishly is known as moral hypocrisy. Influential work by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) found evidence for intergroup moral hypocrisy such that people were more forgiving of transgressions when they were committed by an in-group member than an out-group member. We conducted two experiments to examine moral hypocrisy and group membership in an online paradigm with Prolific workers from the United States: a direct replication of the original work with minimal groups ( N = 610; nationally representative) and a conceptual replication with political groups ( N = 606; 50% Democrats and 50% Republicans). Although the results did not replicate the original findings, we observed evidence of in-group favoritism in minimal groups and out-group derogation in political groups. The current research finds mixed evidence of intergroup moral hypocrisy and has implications for understanding the contextual dependencies of intergroup bias and partisanship.

Determining the manipulation unit of working memory is one of the fundamental questions in understanding how working memory functions. The prevalent object-based theory in cognitive research predicts that memory manipulation is performed on the level of objects. Here we show instead that the basic units of working memory manipulation are Boolean maps, a data structure describing what can be perceived in an instant. We developed four new manipulation tasks (with data from 80 adults) and showed that manipulation times only increased when the number of Boolean maps manipulated increased. Increasing the number of orientations manipulated did not induce longer manipulation times, consistent with a key prediction of the Boolean map theory. Our results show that Boolean maps are the manipulation unit of working memory.

Despite the persistence of anti-Black racism, White Americans report feeling worse off than Black Americans. We suggest that some White Americans may report low well-being despite high group-level status because of perceptions that they are falling behind their in-group. Using census-based quota sampling, we measured status comparisons and health among Black ( N = 452, Wave 1) and White ( N = 439, Wave 1) American adults over a period of 6 to 7 weeks. We found that Black and White Americans tended to make status comparisons within their own racial groups and that most Black participants felt better off than their racial group, whereas most White participants felt worse off than their racial group. Moreover, we found that White Americans’ perceptions of falling behind “most White people” predicted fewer positive emotions at a subsequent time, which predicted worse sleep quality and depressive symptoms in the future. Subjective within-group status did not have the same consequences among Black participants.

Using publicly available data from 299 preregistered replications from the social sciences, we found that the language used to describe a study can predict its replicability above and beyond a large set of controls related to the article characteristics, study design and results, author information, and replication effort. To understand why, we analyzed the textual differences between replicable and nonreplicable studies. Our findings suggest that the language in replicable studies is transparent and confident, written in a detailed and complex manner, and generally exhibits markers of truthful communication, possibly demonstrating the researchers' confidence in the study. Nonreplicable studies, however, are vaguely written and have markers of persuasion techniques, such as the use of positivity and clout. Thus, our findings allude to the possibility that authors of nonreplicable studies are more likely to make an effort, through their writing, to persuade readers of their (possibly weaker) results.

Our understanding of ownership influences how we interact with objects and with each other. Here, we studied people’s intuitions about ownership transfer using a set of simple, parametrically varied events. We found that people ( N = 120 U.S. adults) had similar intuitions about ownership for some events but sharply opposing intuitions for others (Experiment 1). People ( N = 120 U.S. adults) were unaware of these conflicts and overestimated ownership consensus (Experiment 2). Moreover, differences in people’s ownership intuitions predicted their intuitions about the acceptability of using, altering, controlling, and destroying the owned object ( N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 3), even when ownership was not explicitly mentioned ( N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 4). Subject-level analyses suggest that these disagreements reflect at least two underlying intuitive theories, one in which intentions are central to ownership and another in which physical possession is prioritized.

The aggregation of many lay judgments generates surprisingly accurate estimates. This phenomenon, called the “wisdom of crowds,” has been demonstrated in domains such as medical decision-making and financial forecasting. Previous research identified two factors driving this effect: the accuracy of individual assessments and the diversity of opinions. Most available strategies to enhance the wisdom of crowds have focused on improving individual accuracy while neglecting the potential of increasing opinion diversity. Here, we study a complementary approach to reduce collective error by promoting erroneous divergent opinions. This strategy proposes to anchor half of the crowd to a small value and the other half to a large value before eliciting and averaging all estimates. Consistent with our mathematical modeling, four experiments ( N = 1,362 adults) demonstrated that this method is effective for estimation and forecasting tasks. Beyond the practical implications, these findings offer new theoretical insights into the epistemic value of collective decision-making.

We often use cues from our environment when we get stuck searching our memories, but prior research has failed to show benefits of cuing with other, randomly selected list items during memory search. What accounts for this discrepancy? We proposed that cues’ content critically determines their effectiveness and sought to select the right cues by building a computational model of how cues affect memory search. Participants ( N = 195 young adults from the United States) recalled significantly more items when receiving our model’s best (vs. worst) cue. Our model provides an account of why some cues better aid recall: Effective cues activate contexts most similar to the remaining items’ contexts, facilitating recall in an unsearched area of memory. We discuss our contributions in relation to prominent theories about the effect of external cues.

How do children learn what a word means when its uses are consistent with many possible meanings? One influential idea is that children rely on an inductive bias that ensures that novel words get assigned distinct meanings from known words— mutual exclusivity. Here, we explore the possibility that mutual-exclusivity phenomena do not reflect a bias but rather information encoded in the message. Learners might effectively be told when (and when not) to assume that word meanings are mutually exclusive. In three experiments ( N = 106 from across the United States; ages 2 years, 0 months−2 years, 11 months), we show that 2-year-olds only assumed that novel words have distinct meanings if the words were spoken with focus, an information-structural marker of contrast. Without focus, we found no mutual exclusivity; novel words were understood to label familiar objects. These results provide a novel account of mutual exclusivity and demonstrate an early emerging understanding of focus and information structure.