Rapidly forgetting information once attention is diverted seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. The cause of this rapid decline has been debated for decades; some researchers claim that memory traces decay as a function of time out of the focus of attention, whereas others claim that prior memory traces cause confusability by interfering with the current trace. Here we demonstrate that performance after a long delay can be better than performance after a short delay if the temporal confusability between the current item and previous items is reduced. These results provide strong evidence for the importance of temporal confusability, rather than decay, as the cause of forgetting over the short term.
The ability to judge another individual's romantic interest level-both toward oneself and toward others-is an adaptively important skill when choosing a suitable mate to pursue. We tested this ability using videos of individuals on speed dates as stimuli. Male and female observers were equally good at predicting interest levels, but they were more accurate when predicting male interest: Predictions of female interest were just above chance. Observers predicted interest successfully using stimuli as short as 10 s, and they performed best when watching clips of the middle or end of the speed date. There was considerable variability between daters, with some being very easy to read and others apparently masking their true intentions. Variability between observers was also found. The results suggest that the ability to read nonverbal behavior quickly in mate choice is present not only for individuals in the interaction, but also for third-party observers.
Having power means that one makes decisions that determine the outcomes of less powerful others (e.g., Deprét & Fiske, 1993). In fact, powerful people sometimes face multiple impactful, complicated decisions a day, with little room for error. How do they accomplish this? Recent research indicates that power changes not only a person’s responsibilities, but also the way a person thinks. The powerful process information more abstractly—integrating information to extract the gist, detecting patterns and relationships—than the powerless (Smith & Trope, 2006). Work on unconscious-thought theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) suggests that such abstract thinking leads to better decisions when the situation is complex. Individuals who think consciously are unable to consider all relevant attributes, due to consciousness ’ limited capacity. The piecemeal nature of conscious thought also leads them to weight these attributes suboptimally. In contrast, unconscious thought (i.e., thought when conscious attention is directed elsewhere) is more abstract, integrating information to form a summary judgment. Indeed, unconscious thought leads to better decisions than does conscious thought in complex situations (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). Conscious thought impairs performance in part because it is piecemeal. If the powerful think more abstractly than the powerless by default, they should tend to think more abstractly even when thinking consciously. The powerful would then be spared the performance deficits accompanying conscious thought. This hypothesis moves beyond the debate of whether the powerful (Fiske, 1993) or the powerless (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008) are normally under greater attentional demands: High-power participants should perform equally well regardless
We examined the possibility of an in-group advantage in detecting intergroup anxiety. Specifically, we videotaped White and Black participants while they engaged in same-race or interrace interactions. Then we asked White and Black observers to view these videotapes (unaware of the racial context) and provide their impressions of participants' anxiety. Two results pointed to an in-group advantage in detecting intergroup anxiety. First, only same-race observers perceived a modulation of participants' anxious behavior as a function of racial context. This held true not only for relatively subjective perceptions of global anxiety, but also for perceptions of single, discrete behaviors tied to anxiety. Second, we found that only same-race observers provided descriptions of anxiety that tracked reliably with participants' cortisol changes during the task. These results suggest that White and Black Americans may have difficulty developing a sense of shared emotional experience.
Previous research has disagreed about whether a difficult cognitive skill is best learned by beginning with easy or difficult examples. Two experiments that clarify this debate are reported. Participants in both experiments received one of three types of training on a difficult perceptual categorization task. In one condition, participants began with easy examples, then moved to examples of intermediate difficulty, and finished with the most difficult examples. In a second condition, this order was reversed, and in a third condition, participants saw examples in a random order. The results depended on the type of categories that participants were learning. When the categories could be learned via explicit reasoning (a rule-based task), the three training procedures were equally effective. However, when the categorization rule was difficult to describe verbally (an information-integration task), participants who began with the most difficult items performed much better than participants in the other two conditions.
Previous research has shown that the detectability of a local change in a visual image is essentially independent of the complexity of the image when the interstimulus interval (ISI) is very short, but is limited by a low-capacity memory system when the ISI exceeds 100 ms. In the study reported here, listeners made same/different judgments on pairs of successive "chords" (sums of pure tones with random frequencies). The change to be detected was always a frequency shift in one of the tones, and which tone would change was unpredictable. Performance worsened as the number of tones increased, but this effect was not larger for 2-s ISIs than for 0-ms ISIs. Similar results were obtained when a chord was followed by a single tone that had to be judged as higher or lower than the closest component of the chord. Overall, our data suggest that change detection is based on different mechanisms in audition and vision.
Prior work indicates that preschoolers (ages 4-5) maintain high self-appraisals and behavioral engagement after performing less well than their peers. This study tested the hypothesis that relative failure has more negative consequences for preschoolers when they interpret achievement differences as being tied to membership in social categories (e.g., when members of different categories have different achievement levels), as opposed to variations in individual effort. Preschoolers (N= 58) were randomly assigned to receive feedback that a same-gender, other-gender, or gender-unidentified peer performed better than they did on a novel task. Experiences of failure relative to other-gender peers resulted in impaired performance on a subsequent task trial, as well as lack of improvement in self-evaluations after children received more positive feedback. These findings have implications for the origins of social comparisons, category-based reasoning, and the development of gender stereotypes and achievement motivation.
A study examined the relation between individuals' circadian rhythm and their tendency to exhibit transference effects in social perception. Individuals tested at times of circadian mismatch (i.e., morning persons tested in the evening and evening persons tested in the morning) exhibited more pronounced transference effects than individuals tested at times of circadian match (i.e., morning persons tested in the morning and evening persons tested in the evening). These findings are compatible with the notion that transference effects represent everyday social-cognitive functioning related to activation of social schemata. Additionally, however, they suggest that transference effects are not the inevitable consequence of activating the significant other's schema. Rather, such effects might be particularly likely to occur when an individual's mental resources are limited, as might be the case during circadian mismatches. This latter suggestion differs from psychodynamic views of transference as exclusively a driven, energy-intensive phenomenon.
Previous research has shown that dominant individuals frequently think in terms of dominance hierarchies, which typically invoke vertical metaphor (e.g., "upper" vs. "lower" class). Accordingly, we predicted that in spatial attention paradigms, such individuals would systematically favor the vertical dimension of space more than individuals low in dominance. This prediction was supported by two studies (total N= 96), which provided three tests involving two different spatial attention paradigms. In all cases, analyses controlling for speed of response to horizontal spatial probes revealed that more dominant individuals were faster than less dominant individuals to respond to probes along the vertical dimension of space. Such data support the metaphor-representation perspective, according to which people think in metaphoric terms, even in on-line processing tasks. These results have implications for understanding dominance and also indicate that conceptual metaphor is relevant to understanding the cognitive-processing basis of personality.