Knowledge that Transforms

Task-oriented activities often involve a certain degree of waiting before the actual activities commence. We suggest that seemingly irrelevant situational cues in the task environment, such as queue guides, area carpets, or the location of another person, can serve as virtual boundaries that divide the task system into two categories: inside the system versus outside the system. Results from two laboratory and two field studies show that in-system individuals (i.e., those who have crossed the virtual boundary demarcated by these cues) are more likely than out-system individuals to adopt an implemental mind-set, as manifested by increased immediacy of action initiation, increased persistence in task-oriented behavior, and increased optimism. Further, these effects are attenuated when people are given sufficient extrinsic incentives to fulfill the task.

It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion--inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion-but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions--showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.

Judging the laterality of a hand seen at unanticipated orientations evokes a robust feeling of bodily movement, even though no movement is produced. In two experiments, we tested a novel hypothesis to explain this phenomenon: A hand's laterality is determined via a multisensory binding of the visual representation of the seen hand and a proprioceptive representation of the observer's felt hand, and the felt "movement" is an obligatory aftereffect of intersensory recalibration. Consistent with the predictions implied by such a cross-modal mechanism, our results in Experiment 1 showed that manipulating observers' selective attention can evoke illusory feelings of movement in the "wrong" hand (i.e., the hand whose laterality does not match that of the stimulus). In Experiment 2, these illusions were readily extinguished in conditions in which binding was predicted to fail, a result indicating that cross-modal binding was necessary to produce them. These results are not explained by imagery, a mechanism widely assumed to account for how hand laterality is identified.

Hindsight bias is the tendency to retrospectively think of outcomes as being more foreseeable than they actually were. It is a robust judgment bias and is difficult to correct (or "debias"). In the experiments reported here, we used a visual paradigm in which performers decided whether blurred photos contained humans. Evaluators, who saw the photos unblurred and thus knew whether a human was present, estimated the proportion of participants who guessed whether a human was present. The evaluators exhibited visual hindsight bias in a way that matched earlier data from judgments of historical events surprisingly closely. Using eye tracking, we showed that a higher correlation between the gaze patterns of performers and evaluators (shared attention) is associated with lower hindsight bias. This association was validated by a causal method for debiasing: Showing the gaze patterns of the performers to the evaluators as they viewed the stimuli reduced the extent of hindsight bias.

It is frequently suggested that increasing awareness of intergroup bias and limited control over biased responses can improve intergroup interaction behavior. Some uses of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) epitomize this approach to improving intergroup relations. However, if completing the IAT enhances caution and inhibition, reduces self-efficacy, or primes categorical thinking, the test may instead have negative effects. Two experiments demonstrated that when White individuals completed a race-relevant IAT prior to an intergroup interaction (as compared with when they did not), their interaction partner left the exchange feeling less positively regarded. No such effect was evident when White individuals completed a race-irrelevant IAT (Study 1) or an explicit prejudice measure (Study 2) before the exchange, or when their interaction partner was White (Study 1). Mediation analyses (Study 2) suggested that White participants who completed the IAT communicated less positive regard because they adopted a cautious approach to the interaction, limiting their self-disclosure.

Taking a memory test after an initial study phase produces better long-term retention than restudying the items, a phenomenon known as the testing effect. We propose that this effect emerges because testing strengthens semantic features of items' memory traces, whereas restudying strengthens surface features of items' memory traces. This novel account predicts that a testing effect should be observed even after a short retention interval when a language switch occurs between the learning phase and the final test phase. We assessed this prediction with Dutch-English bilinguals who learned Dutch Deese-Roediger-McDermott word lists through restudying or through testing (retrieval practice). Five minutes after this learning phase, they took a recognition test in Dutch (within-language condition) or in English (across-language condition). We observed a testing effect in the across-language condition, but not in the within-language condition. These findings corroborate our novel account of the testing effect.

Research has documented a robust stereotype regarding personality attributes related to physical attractiveness (the "what is beautiful is good" stereotype). But do physically attractive women indeed possess particularly attractive inner attributes? Studying traits and values, we investigated two complementary questions: how perceived attractiveness relates to perceived personality, and how it relates to actual personality. First, 118 women reported their traits and values and were videotaped reading the weather forecast. Then, 118 judges rated the traits, values, and attractiveness of the women. As hypothesized, attractiveness correlated with attribution of desirable traits, but not with attribution of values. By contrast, attractiveness correlated with actual values, but not actual traits: Attractiveness correlated with tradition and conformity values (which were contrasted with self-direction values) and with self-enhancement values (which were contrasted with universalism values). Thus, despite the widely accepted "what is beautiful is good" stereotype, our findings suggest that the beautiful strive for conformity rather than independence and for self-promotion rather than tolerance.

Five studies examined whether the practice of regifting--a social taboo--is as offensive to the original givers as potential regifters assume. Participants who imagined regifting a gift (receivers) thought that the original giver would be more offended than participants who imagined that their gifts were regifted (givers) reported feeling. Specifically, receivers viewed regifting as similar in offensiveness to throwing gifts away, yet givers clearly preferred the former. This asymmetry in emotional reactions to regifting was driven by an asymmetry in beliefs about entitlement. Givers believed that the act of gift giving passed title to the gift on to receivers, so that receivers were free to decide what to do with the gift; in contrast, receivers believed that givers retained some say in how their gifts were used. Finally, an intervention designed to destigmatize regifting by introducing a different normative standard (i.e., National Regifting Day) corrected the asymmetry in beliefs about entitlement and increased regifting.